

CORPORATION FOR PUBLIC BROADCASTING

CPB PRE-PROPOSAL CONFERENCE

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BOB COONROD: Welcome to all of you. Welcome, first of all, to the distinguished members of our panel today. Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick, Christopher Hitchens, and Michael Haltzel from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff. I'd also like to acknowledge the support of Sharon Rockefeller and her team from WETA, Judi Moore-Latta and her team from Howard University Television and of course PBS, who are co-hosting this event with us today. And my thanks especially to all of you for joining us this afternoon to discuss this initiative that we're launching this week called America at a Crossroads.

There's a transformation that's taking place in public television, and today's panel discussion is an illustration of that transformation. It's the first time that the Corporation for Public Broadcasting has played such an active role in laying the intellectual and substantive foundation for future public television productions. We've never before involved nationally recognized experts in conversations with producers before proposals are drafted, and we've never before offered producers the opportunity to develop and to discuss their ideas in quite this way.

This transformation has other dimensions as well. As we begin our meeting today here in Washington, representatives of 16 public television stations are meeting in a conference room near O'Hare Airport. There was a similar meeting yesterday in Philadelphia, and there will be meetings across the country. By month's end, well over half of the nation's 356 public television stations will have agreed to embark on a multiyear journey to redefine their roles in their communities, improve their local services, and change the way they raise money from their members and their major donors.

And also by month's end, as a result of this initiative, producers in cities across the country--New York, Chicago, Dallas, San Francisco, and Los Angeles--will have discussed, as you will today, how public television will play a more active role in the critical national debate. America at a Crossroads is intended to support the production and national broadcast of incisive, insightful programs on the most important issues facing our nation. Toward this end, CPB is making an unprecedented commitment. Over the next few years, we are prepared to devote as much as \$20 million to this effort. America at a Crossroads is different in size and scope, in method and approach. Yet its aspirations are those that have informed our work from the very beginning. Public broadcasting has long been the place to find in-depth, high-quality programming that informs, engages, and enriches the national dialogue. And the programs funded through America at a Crossroads will carry on that tradition.

So, I very much welcome you. I'm going to turn the program over to Michael Pack, the Senior Vice President for Television Programming at CPB, and I look forward to both the presentations and to a lively dialogue after that. Thanks very much to all of you for being here.

MICHAEL PACK: Thank you, Bob.

I also want to thank, in the addition to the people that Bob has already thanked, the staff here at CPB who have pulled this event together on rather short notice, and my colleague, Jim Denton, who is a consultant to the Corporation for Public Broadcasting and a mastermind of this initiative and has, himself, a long, distinguished career in foreign policy and human rights and was formerly Executive Director of Freedom House.

What I would like to do is discuss how we came up with this initiative and what its context is, and then I'll turn the discussion over to the panel. I came here to CPB about a year ago. I had previously been an independent producer, like many of the people in the room. When I came, I was given the mandate by the board of CPB and by my senior management to develop initiatives in the fields of both public affairs and education.

Let me also acknowledge the Chairman of the Board for the Corporation of Public Broadcasting, Ken Tomlinson, for joining us. Thank you, Ken.

KEN TOMLINSON: It's very unusual for a meeting like this to start on time. Congratulations.

MR. PACK: Well, Bob was saying that it's a new day for public television. Maybe that's another sign of that. I don't know I'd want to promise that that'll happen at every meeting.

Ken really is one of the major impetuses behind this initiative. He and the board felt strongly that we need to do something related to public affairs. So when I came, my team and I traveled the country and talked to a number of public television stations, we attended numerous public television meetings, including the annual PBS meeting and regional meetings, and we spoke to as many people as we could.

And it soon became apparent that the big issue facing this country is, where are we heading post-September 11th? We've entered a new era with a lot of questions. It's something like the beginning of the Cold War, and it is likely to go on for a while. Do we want a war on terror? Where should it head? Is radical Islam a problem? What should we do about it? Is the Patriot Act the right way to defend the homeland, and are there civil liberty issues? A host of very important, far reaching questions.

And it was our sense, and the sense of the people we spoke to, that the public needed more depth of knowledge on those subjects. Yes, television was treating them, but it was not treating them with the depth, say, of print. And I would say, despite the very significant contributions of some great public television programs, given the importance

of these issues, there was not enough in-depth treatment from enough diverse points of view. So we took that information back to CPB.

The other information we took back, which doesn't relate directly to this meeting, but relates to where we're heading in the area of education, is a sense that children in middle school and high school do not know enough about American history and the importance of civic engagement. You know all the data. Kids don't know what century the Civil War was in, they don't know who fought in World War II—as Jay Leno periodically goes onto the street to demonstrate. A generation is growing up not only ignorant about American history, but not engaged in the civic process. So shortly we're going to launch another initiative, an initiative to come up with media, not just television programs but Web sites, interactive material, and classroom material, designed to teach middle and high school students something about American history and civics. That will be later.

But for now, we also came back with a sense that the issues facing this country post 9/11 is a rich area for public television. It is an area that plays to public television's strengths, these questions that face America post-9/11. This is something that we do well. It is our mission, it is the reason Congress funds us, to inform the public about issues of great national importance.

So when we came back with all this input, we crafted this initiative, and we set aside, as Bob said, up to \$20 million over several years to fund documentaries and limited series that would address those subjects from a diversity of points of view. We've constructed a multiphase process. First, we're going to give R&D grants, then production grants, and then what we're calling dissemination grants, which would relate to distribution, outreach, and follow-on education uses. One of the reasons we came up with the multiphase approach is to bring in new entrants. We felt that by giving out a greater variety of R&D grants, we could encourage people who maybe hadn't received grants from CPB before to apply. And we strongly wanted to encourage people to do things differently, to come up with something unique.

To that end, CPB is planning to fund these programs at a significantly higher proportion than is usual so that producers can make these shows quickly and spend their time doing a film rather than fundraising. We also want producers to be creative, innovative, and yes, controversial. One of the limitations on making controversial shows often is the difficulty of getting foundation or corporate funding, and we wanted to establish a process that will allow for the production of controversial shows from a diversity of points of view.

We announced and launched the Crossroads initiative and, a few days ago, the information was posted on the CPB web site. However, because Crossroads also represents a new way of doing business at CPB, we will also convene a series of meetings around the country, of which this is the first, to meet with producers and other interested persons to explain the Crossroads initiative and its rationale. These meetings will include two basic parts: a substantive discussion by expert panelists who will

highlight what they believe are the key post 9/11 issues, and secondly, a more technical discussion about the Crossroads purpose, goals, guidelines and review/selection process. We believe that the substantive discussion by experts will provide an appropriate backdrop to our conversation, as well as perhaps stimulate ideas among the filmmakers. I hasten to add, that the panelists' views are their own, and CPB is not in any way implying that the panelists' views should narrow or limit the thinking behind the film proposals that might be submitted. The panelist's comments and ideas are intended to stimulate and provide backdrop to today's discussion, and perhaps convey CPB's commitment to the seriousness of the issues we are addressing and the seriousness of purpose to which we trust the filmmakers will aspire.

I'm going to introduce the panel, and then I'm going to ask each panelist to speak briefly on the question, what are the most important issues facing America post-9/11? And, more particularly, given that we're creating television programs, what is it that the American people need to know that they don't know, or need to know better, and how might that be treated?

After they each speak for a few minutes, I will ask them to speak among themselves, if they wish, and then I will take questions from the audience. I'd like to first take questions directed to the panel relating to the substance of these issues, and then questions related to the grant-making process.

Let me introduce the panel briefly. You have their bios, and they do not need much introduction. First, there's Michael Haltzel, who is Senator Joseph Biden's (D/DE) senior foreign affairs advisor, and the Senator is the ranking member on the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee, and Dr. Haltzel is a professor and writer. Then there is Christopher Hitchens, an internationally known and highly respected journalist and author, a writer for the *Nation* for many years and now for *Vanity Fair*, no stranger to controversy, and a sought after commentator with many interesting and provocative ideas. And, then Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick, who served with great distinction in the Reagan cabinet as the US Ambassador to the United Nations, a scholar, Georgetown University professor, author of numerous books and articles, and a diplomat whose ideas have shaped American foreign policy for decades.

Let me begin by asking Mr. Haltzel to speak.

MICHAEL HALTZEL: Thank you.

I would like to begin with what really shouldn't be a controversial statement, but may be taken as such: what do we need to know about September 11th? I would say the first thing is that the White House should give the independent commission investigating 9/11 the access so far denied it. There are all sorts of documents being shielded because of supposed executive privilege. They had to really go to the mat to get an extension of two months to even complete their work. The bipartisan commission is chaired by the former Republican Governor of New Jersey, Tom Kean. Just for the life of me, I think

this is the absolute minimum that we have to have in order to understand where we go from here.

But I would like to speak briefly about three different levels, as I see it, of what we should be thinking about among many, many issues. At the personal level, and this is going to perhaps sound a little bit banal, but September 11th reinforced those little bits of wisdom that your parents told you, and that perhaps over the years or decades since, you might have tucked away in a corner of your brain. Things like "Live everyday as if it were your last." When you lose neighbors, as I did at the Pentagon; when you know that where you work is right in the crosshairs, as we know from captured al Qaeda documents at a safehouse in Kabul--I know this sounds Pollyannaish, but we all ought to think about our behavior, think about how we treat our neighbors. Many people commented on the fact that after September 11th, there seemed to be this wonderful spirit of national unity palpable across the country. People really did start treating each other a little more politely. Maybe we weren't so aggressive on the highways. Obviously it's not provable, but I certainly felt that that was a reaction. And just valuing and cherishing life is something that we should all think about. Maybe this is turning lemons into lemonade, but if so I plead guilty.

At the national level, obviously we have to be more aware that we have to protect our citizens. That's the first responsibility of any national government. The big question, of course, is how we do this. And I think we have to be willing to sacrifice. There's no free lunch, there's no free homeland security, there's no free defense. If that means that we might have to tax ourselves a little bit in order to pay for it, so be it. I think these are lessons we have to learn.

But I think also we should take a look at who we are and take pride in what we are, the miracle that is the United States of America. I, like most of you, am tremendously proud of the way our people reacted on September 11th and immediately thereafter. We'll never forget the New York Fire Department, the police, the civilians running back into the Pentagon to rescue people after they had just crawled out. It's really uplifting. Something like this can only happen in a democracy, and I think we should rededicate ourselves to that wonderful experiment that has made us, in spite of all of our flaws and all of our warts and all of our daily challenges, the most successful multiracial, multireligious, multiethnic society in the world. What I'm saying is, we shouldn't give the terrorists the victory that they can't get on the battlefield by changing our society and changing who we are. That would be my number one message.

At the international level, we've seen and we must learn that as strong as we are, we need allies and friends. We can't do it alone. We need them badly. Our forces alone simply cannot defeat the forces of international terrorism. We need cooperation from foreign police forces, intelligence agencies, bank officials, customs authorities, tax auditors, and all that. And in the main, we've been getting it. This is often overlooked. One reads about the newest trade dispute with the European Union and forgets that actually we've been cooperating on most trade issues and certainly on the antiterrorism

front. We obviously have seen in Iraq and Afghanistan that we can win wars quickly, but then comes the peacemaking and peace enforcing, and we need help there.

So how do we get this help? Well, a perception of a common threat helps. It helps if our friends in Europe and elsewhere realize that they're ultimately threatened by terrorism the way we are. But I don't think that's enough. Frankly, we should be thinking a little bit more about how the United States can be a good international citizen.

Now, let me just say what that doesn't mean. This doesn't mean I'm blaming the victim. None of the flaws that we may have had in our foreign policy, nothing would ever justify what happened on September 11th. I'm not blaming the United States for this. And I'm certainly not talking about ceding our sovereignty to some great international body in the sky. I don't mean that at all. I think most Americans would agree that in a real, acute national security emergency, the use of military force as a last resort does not need a U.N. Security Council resolution, however desirable it might be. But with that as a preface, we can become better international citizens. These are things we all know. What I'm saying is to remind us of what we instinctively know.

And let's face it. Most of the rest of the world is not white, it's not Christian, and it's not rich. And I think one of the reasons that our stock has fallen so precipitously in the last two or three years is because we've tended to be insensitive to the way other peoples may look at the world. It doesn't mean they're always right and we're wrong, by no means. I tend to think we're right more than we're wrong. But we might a little bit more attempt to put ourselves in other people's shoes. We can talk about this in Q&A. Kyoto may have been a flawed protocol, nonetheless you can ask yourself, is it worth basically picking up your toys and going home? The International Criminal Court is I think a flawed document, nonetheless something that we could have negotiated better. There's just a whole series of things that we could be better at in trying to be good international citizens.

Would that cure the fact that America is, let's face it, reviled in much of the world? No. There's a lot of envy out there. There's a lot of what the Germans call *Schadenfreude*, taking glee at other people's misfortunes. But I do think we ought to be a little broader in our view of the world and international relations.

Finally, I think we Americans might try to develop a positive characteristic for which we're not terribly well known, and that is patience. We seem to love the instant solution. I was just down on K Street this afternoon, and I saw a new building at the corner of K and Connecticut--they put on four floors in the last week. It's unbelievable what we can do. And that works well in certain things, like construction on K Street, and it may work well to solve some problems. But it doesn't work well to solve some of the deeper societal problems around the world that, let's face it, do play a role in spawning the terrorism that we're combating. It's going to take time to democratize the greater Middle East, we hope, with our European and other allies. It's going to take money. It's going to take persistence. It's probably a task that will occupy us for the rest of the lives of everybody in this room. But I think we have to be ready to do it.

I'll stop there and hope that you have things to ask us later. Thank you.

CHRISTOPHER HITCHENS: There used to be a weekend game you could play at English country houses if the weather was bad for hunting or shooting or fishing and you had to stay in. The game was that all the guests had to read their own Who's Who entry from the book in the library, and the one with the shortest entry won. I just want you to know that I do have a longer CV that I could have put in today, but I reserve it for non-pro bono events. I felt almost intellectually undraped by comparison to the eminence of my fellow panelists.

It is sometimes held to be the task of the intellectual to stress complexity, and to say, I suppose, the most chloroforming answer that can ever be given to any question: there are no simple answers. It's supposed to be the job of intellectuals to say that simplicity should be avoided, complexity should be stressed. I have no quarrel with this as a rough description of the calling.

But there are also occasions where it's important to stress that things are very simple indeed, and where relatively elementary statements can and in fact sometimes must be made. I think the assault on American civil society on September 11th, 2001, is one such. And I think it becomes the duty then of the intellectual classes to spend a good bit of time upholding the obvious and the given and the common. That's why I didn't find it made me any more polite, I'm sorry to say. I don't think I've ever been as rude to anybody as I was to some people in the days after that. I found that politeness was of no use to me at all in reminding some people that essential moral and ethical simplicities, and political ones too, must be stressed, and that casuistry is really much more of a danger than simplicity to the life of the mind. And I think of it still in this way.

I resent the fact that I cannot easily get to see a replay of those events. Somehow they've disappeared from our screens. It's thought to be perhaps in poor taste to replay these events and remind people of what exactly happened, to see what it's like to having to choose between burning to death or jumping to your death, and perhaps ending up having to choose both, or having both choices forced upon you, and in public at that. I'm annoyed at the way that a cloak of amnesia, a veil of amnesia has been drawn across this scene.

I find it quite ridiculous that the relatives of anyone in those buildings should have any special say. The victims were all at random. They could have been any of us. The whole point of the atrocity is that it could have been and was intended to be anyone at all. There's no special grant of sympathy for anyone who happens to have lost a relative. And, yes, I must say that had President Gore been in office that day, probably these pictures would feature in his reelection propaganda, so there's really no time for petty partisanship in matters of this kind. I think the sheer fact that we haven't seen these pictures for a long time ought to give us some reason to pause, because we're talking about how to transmit and rationalize and extend, and, yes, by all means elaborate and stress the complexity of some very celebrated events.

The best way I can think of doing this is to say, what was our situation on the 10th of September of that year? Afghanistan was being run out of a holy book and into the ground. Its women were chattel, its museums had been voided, its cultural treasures were being gradually destroyed, its Hazara Shia minority was being put to the sword, the Bamiyan Buddhists had been reduced to rubble. There would be in very short order, I think, the return of medieval plague and famine to this area, as well as massacre and sectarianism. And not content with this fairly comprehensive form of state failure, the Taliban leadership was blaming the collapse not upon itself, but rather upon diabolic plots in the West, Crusader-Jewish plots, and it was incubating, sheltering, and hiding an organization that had already declared war on the United States and indeed on civilization. It was getting a small grant every year, not a huge grant but a fairly substantial one, for the war on drugs from the United States government. I think that was our entire contribution to the state of affairs at that point. Colin Powell, I think, personally gave drug war money to the Taliban earlier that year.

If you had been in Islamabad on the 10th of September, you would have noticed the gradual Talibanization of Pakistan. From within the state and from within the army, sympathizers of Talibanism were taking up high positions. There was a slow-motion coup going on inside Pakistan. I counted them in October of that year: there were six known, nameable sympathizers of the al Qaeda organization within the Pakistani nuclear program. And this was not a concern of any committee that I knew about anywhere in Washington, D.C., or on any campus of the American university, or any think tank of the American mind.

And our Saudi allies were paying for all of this and more across the world, in the spread of the Wahabi form of Islam with what we now know to have been, and knew then to have been, as it happens, a message of the most extreme intolerance, hatred, and fanaticism. Some of that money was being spent within our own borders where a secret army had been formed and on the 10th of September was more or less ready to strike. It had been ready for some years, and is still amongst us--in our prison system in some cases, in certain neighborhoods, sheltered by certain mosques, and even conceivably, not impossibly, within some units of our armed forces. This is the most grave internal challenge the Republic has faced since the 1860s.

Meanwhile the Iraqi people were grimly preparing for the Uday and Qusay Hussein regime, which would have been the successor of their father's, by comparison, relatively lenient rule. Iraq had reopened negotiations with North Korea to buy weaponry off the shelf from Pyongyang. Those negotiations only actually stopped, held as they were in Damascus, this month last year, about one year ago today, when the North Koreans pulled out because they were frightened. I was pleased to read in the Kay report, from the captured documents that described the meeting, that they didn't return the deposit that the Ba'ath party had paid them.

Well, that was the state of somnambulism in which our culture and society was then and, in my submission, still remains to a great extent, to an alarming extent. We feel

we've had the wake-up call. You have no idea. You have no idea. You're still half-unconscious.

Now we know the grim truth at least about two things, proliferation and jihad, and the relationship between them, and the relationship between our policy of disarmament and democracy. That's a fairly impressive quadrilateral force to be discussing, don't you think, proliferation and holy war, and disarmament and democracy? And you can't touch any one of these without touching the others. This calls, I think, upon every sinew of our cultural and our intellectual resources.

My preferred way of situating this quadrilateral is to say as follows. There is within the Islamic world a civil war going on. It goes on from Nigeria all the way to Indonesia, and in many other countries too. Ms. Amina Lawal, whose life we think we probably have now saved, was going to be condemned to death by stoning for the crime of having a baby, the evidence of which she was actually clasping to the breast before the Sharia court. No one can tell me this is a revenge for American policy in Chile or even in Palestine at its worst. It is a thing of itself. It is a convulsion of fanaticism that is sweeping the whole Islamic world. I've been to report on it in Indonesia, Iraq, and many other places. And, of course, we saw the synagogues, as well as the European businesses, being blown up in Turkey, in Istanbul, the former capital of the Caliphate, at a time when there was an elected Islamic government running that country.

The reason I mention these examples is to point out what I hope is self-evident. There are many, many millions of Muslims who do not wish to live this way, who don't want to live under Sharia law, who don't want to be dictated to by sectarians of the other sect, or sectarians at all, who do not want their women reduced to chattel, and who are perfectly willing, as they always have been in Turkey, to shelter the Jewish faith and its houses of worship. And it will be our task to find every way we can to make sure we are not just transmitters but receivers of impulses to and from this extraordinary culture war, this Kulturkampf within the Muslim world. And, yes, it means we have allies. To put it crudely, bluntly, we have friends who at least have a common enemy.

Everyone who has not yet read the Zaraqawi memorandum, recently captured on the person of his envoy, Mr. Ghul, a perfectly named emissary who was trying to cross the Iranian border, should read it in full. You can download it and study it intensely. Here is the plain confession from the forces of bin Ladenism that their main hope lies in fighting and starting a religious war, not this time against the Jews and the Crusaders--that's taken for granted--but against the unholy and bestial heretics of Shiia Islam, and it's their holy places that must be attacked by fellow Muslims. So the next time you hear anyone saying America mustn't be seen as Muslim bashing or as hostile to the Muslim world, just remind them who does the killing of Muslims, who does the blowing up of holy shrines, and who murders respected ayatollahs outside their places of worship, and see if they can remain as glib.

We, of course, cannot touch any war that is sectarian as between Sunni and Shiia. We have too many friends on both sides. Our Kurdish comrades are, in their majority,

adherents of the Sunni version of Islam. Some of our enemies in Iran, in the shape of the mullahcracy that's currently imploding and declining, are adherents of the Shiia school.

On my submission, we must be ready very soon to mark the quarter century of the Islamic Republic of Iran with an extraordinary revival of civil society in that country. Are we ready to discuss and renew our relationship with one of the most ancient and sophisticated and literate cultures in the world, one with which America has had a very distraught relationship over the past years? Are we listening to what's being broadcast from there? Are we reading and translating what's been printed? It seems to me that we're not. There would be enough for a good person to spend a life on, simply in reconsidering, refining, sophisticating our relationship with the people of Iran.

I've only got really one more point to make, just to reemphasize my point about our current imperative of solidarity with the government and people of Iraq. Again, it was often said in the run-up to this debate, we must be careful of not offending all Arabs and all Muslims by attacking an Arab Muslim country. The Saddam Hussein constitution did not define Iraq as an Arab state. Even the Saddam Hussein constitution defined it as an Arab and Kurdish state, a state of Arabs and Kurds. It is the site of the most ancient Christianity and the home of several hundred thousand Christians from antiquity. In 1947-48, there were more Jews in Baghdad than there were in Jerusalem, and there were also many, many different confessions and shades of Islam.

We have to understand Iraq in the same way we would wish to understand ourselves: as a multiethnic, multicultural, multi-confessional patchwork society, the only possible model, as it happens, of human coexistence. What Iraq does not have is a political system that reflects that fact or honors it. Are we being colonial in saying there are advantages to federalism and multiculturalism and multiethnicity? I submit that we are not. I submit that something can be learned from the American experiment.

It's wonderful to see, I have to tell you, the faces of the Iraqis and the Afghans as they see some young, blond American girl from Idaho walking down the street with a male colleague, getting into a Jeep, and then getting into a helicopter, and she's at the controls. And you see people drinking this in all the time. I also like to think of what went through the minds of the Taliban when they realized there was a woman pilot at the controls of that F-16--but one mustn't gloat, of course. We don't know what the effects of this are. We have every reason to think they may be healthy.

I think what we might therefore do, by way of a cultural inquiry and project and investigation, is to see in what respects what we have accomplished here can be applied to the Islamic world, and how we can learn from their experiments in this multicultural, multiethnic, and multi-confessional life and society. This could be a wonderful reciprocity, something that would never bore you, that would continue your education for many years to come.

And my final plea would be this. In our country, the guarantee of this pluralism is secularism. There couldn't be religious freedom or religious pluralism if there wasn't a

constitution that forbade the government to take account of religion and that refused to mention the name of God in the founding documents. I wish that secularism was taken more seriously as an outlook, an attitude, and a culture by the administration and by its spokesmen, and that by no word or gesture did we ever act as if we could be so foolish as to think anything we did had God on its side. If we learn to take these values seriously abroad, as we have to, we will have to learn to take them extremely seriously at home.

It would be wonderful to work on a series engaged in any of the topics I so briefly have been able to touch on. Thank you.

JEANE KIRKPATRICK: Those were two stunning presentations, and I feel fortunate to have heard them. And I think that the seriousness with which the Corporation for Public Broadcasting is undertaking this is enormously important, and I congratulate everyone who engaged in defining it and planning it and coming here.

I agree with the points that have been made so far, especially concerning the importance of this time. I believe that 9/11 was a colossally important event in American history, maybe the most important event since the Pilgrims landed at Plymouth Rock, or since somebody thought about freeing the slaves.

It's enormously important, very fundamental. I heard two days ago at Georgetown a visiting Israeli professor deliver a really brilliant lecture. He is convinced that the event has been so colossally important, not just for Americans but for Israel and the world. It changed the terms on which we live, and the terms on which we need to think about almost everything, including security--it left in shambles most of our cherished ideas about security.

So I think that this sense that something enormously important has happened is already somewhat widespread, and instead of diminishing, it's growing. And I think it would be tremendously important to have the Corporation for Public Broadcasting engaged in thinking about this with all of us, helping all of us think about it. CPB would be a very important participant in a serious reflection on how the world has changed after 9/11.

One thing I feel certain about is that the worst mistake we could make would be to try to forget, not think about it, and try to not think about what it meant for our American society and American life and our world. Christopher Hitchens referred to the role of women. The Taliban was almost unbelievably harsh and inhuman in their treatment of women and girls in Afghanistan. I'm sure everybody has seen something about it, read something about it. I think there ought to be a good show on that, for example--not to embarrass the Afghans, for whom I have a lot of sympathy, but to embarrass the Taliban, to remind people of what it does to a society to dehumanize large portions of it, in case anyone had forgotten. I understand the Afghans have not forgotten, although the Taliban is still there, active and fighting among them.

I was very impressed by the study that the United Nations Development Program, UNDP, did on development in the Arab world. I wish CPB would do a good program on that study. I would like to watch it, and I would like to recommend it to all my students. It's probing and comprehensive in its conception of culture and gender and all of the dimensions of society that are critically important in determining what life will be like for the people who live in it.

Christopher Hitchens mentioned the Saudis and the Saudi role in some of the less acceptable aspects of Muslim society. It's not Saudi society; it's just some of the least acceptable aspects of that society. I think it would be wonderful if the Corporation for Public Broadcasting taught us more. Again, I'd like to see such programs, I'd like to watch them, I'd like to learn from them--programs in some depth about life in some remote and very, very different cultures and societies and economies. And I think as we learn more about some of these dramatically different societies and cultures, we also would be helped in appreciating our own more than we often do, which is also important. I like the way that Mike emphasized this point in his statements.

I think public television is the most potentially productive, creative, useful educational tool in our society, or in any society. And I don't think we have explored it adequately. I'm a professor. I've thought all my life about education, my own and my students most especially. And I think that with creative use, imaginative use, public television can help in relationship to some of the extraordinarily profound issues that confront us today. What 9/11 has given us is a sense of the profound, not possibilities, not opportunities, but probabilities of revolutionary change that confront us. And so I say to you, congratulations, and full speed ahead.

MR. PACK: Before we take questions, let me ask if you want to pose any questions to each other. Do you have one, Mike?

MR. HALTZEL: Well, my colleagues really were great. And I disagree with almost nothing that was said, but I would like to ask Christopher one or two questions.

One thing, when you talked about Afghanistan on September 10th, and you know this better than anybody else in the room, but I would have said that the big news would have been the assassination of Ahmed Shah Massoud the day before, which was a prelude to September 11th, and one of the huge tragedies in that part of the world that they're still living with.

And I wish you could elaborate a bit upon the secret army. I don't profess to know much about the dangers of radical Islam in the United States. My gut feeling is that certainly there are a few radical mosques in Paterson, New Jersey, and Lackawanna, New York, and wherever else, and, Lord knows, we have problems with a huge incarcerated population from a variety of standpoints. But I was a little bit taken aback by the term secret army. And I wonder if you could give us a sense if this is well organized, or if it's a potential problem, or just how far it's gone.

MR. HITCHENS: Of course I should have mentioned Massoud. I always think of it as having happened on the same day, probably wrongly. But I remember what was unbearable to me was the thought of the wolfish grin that must have been on the face of bin Laden. He thought, not only did we take out their man in the Northern Alliance, and it was so easy, but we took out New York and the Pentagon, and that was so easy, too. And it was purely the fault of air traffic control in Newark that we didn't get the Capitol. If it wasn't for the sheer incompetence of air traffic control at Newark airport, the passengers on that plane would have not had time to find out that they didn't have a chance and wouldn't have brought it down, which was the only good news of the day.

But I think bin Laden did us a favor; I've thought so for a long time. The Talibanization of Pakistan will now not take place. It was taking place. They had every chance of completing it. Bin Laden is not a fundamentalist, he's a fanatic. It's not enough for him that the good cause is advanced, there must be some amazing fanatical, melodramatic, ultimate sort of Leni Riefenstahl event. If he was a Catholic, he'd be Mel Gibson.

The favor, the blessing--obviously very well disguised, but nonetheless a blessing--is that since that day, the Saudi Arabians have thought it's really not worth the trouble to go on supporting these organizations that they were supporting. It isn't worth it. Other governments have come to the conclusion it's not worth harboring these people, let alone paying for them, and still others have decided it's not worth making a fool of the nonproliferation treaty and trying to conceal weapons of mass destruction.

All of these are amazing positive developments, for which I think the president and his advisors, by the way, don't get enough credit. If we overestimated the number of weapons in Iraq, which it's possible we did, it was the right side on which to err, with a regime with that record. It's better than underestimating, as we did with Libya, Iran, Pakistan, and others.

But here's the question: why was there no follow-up? I wonder, what's going to happen next from al Qaeda? They can't have sent just that number of people to the United States. It was so pathetically easy to get them in. They were waved in. They were given visas, they weren't molested, they must have been laughing all the time at how easy it was. Where does the next blow come from? It hasn't come. There are only two conclusions one can draw from this. One is that was all they've got, that's the whole plan, that was it. The great professor John Keegan, who is a very considerable historian, thinks that that is part of the tradition of Bedouin warfare, one tremendous dawn strike, and they rush off into the dunes with what you can round up of your enemy's flocks, property, women, and chattel, and so forth, and that's the victory. That's it.

I'm not so sure these people are this dumb, because there's evidence all over the place of something like a common mentality. There was a mosque in San Diego, founded with Wahabi money, which the FBI agent in charge refused to enter, even though he was asked to do it, to take some depositions. By the way--never mind, I'm not going to go there. This is not CPB business. But no one has offered to resign in the FBI or the CIA,

which seems to me quite extraordinary. The President shouldn't be put to the trouble of having to fire people who have failed us in this way.

And there are radio stations, and newspapers and bulletins, and religious schools and madrassas, and they are growing in the United States. It's not enough to get paranoid about. Everyone must admire the spirit in which the American public have accepted, as it were, this new minority. But it does need to be watched. Every now and then you find that in some terrible maximum security block--we thought maximum security--of one of our major prisons, the chaplaincy for the Muslim prisoners is under the command of a Wahabi fanatic group. Our armed forces are not immune to this either. There have been attempts to form cells there, too. And it doesn't, you see, take very many. For someone willing to kill themselves, and to get close enough to a major sensitive or emotionally important target, it doesn't take very many. And they do have quite a lot of time, and they are very patient. So I don't mean to sound paranoid, and I don't want to instill paranoia. I hope that's a fair enough answer.

MR. HITCHENS: I did want to congratulate Ambassador Kirkpatrick. I should have mentioned myself the UNDP study on the Arab world. I don't know how many of you have read it, but it's fascinating. One of its authors lives in Washington, D.C., in fact, and is someone who I'm sure one should be consulting: Clovis Maksoud, who resigned as Ambassador of the League of Arab States after the last Gulf War because of the Arab world's policy on Iraq, a very principled, very intelligent man. More books are translated in Greek in Athens every year, twice as many, as in the whole Arab world. There's an extraordinary cultural deficit, and this is the climate of ignorance and chauvinism in which one has to expect the direst result. But Clovis Maksoud is around.

MR. HALTZEL: I should have congratulated Ambassador Kirkpatrick for her ideas about what sort of programming CPB should do, and I think any sort of enlightenment like this is essential. It would be nice if people knew more about the different strains within Islam, so that we could have a rational discussion.

I have to say, one kind of program which might be very painful for Americans, but I think would ultimately be very interesting, occurred to me two weeks ago. I gave a talk in, of all places, Denmark, which is about as enlightened and pro-American a society as one could find in the world, and I was talking to some young people, younger people anyway, early 30s maybe, who had just been in the high schools in Denmark doing some sort of research. And they themselves, Danes, were shocked at the attitudes they encountered about the United States. And it would take a very sophisticated moderator--CPB is probably the only group that could do it--who could chair a discussion with people from any part of Europe or from other parts of the world.

I am concerned that we don't quite see ourselves the way much of the rest of the world sees us. And these attitudes have been changing rapidly, one of the great changes since September 11th. They are not to our benefit. I think in the main the attitudes are founded upon ignorance and prejudice, but that doesn't help us very much. So I would urge that to be at least one part of the series.

MR. PACK: Any other questions? Then let me take some questions from the audience.

QUESTION: I'm working on a documentary on the news media leading up to the Iraq war, and one of the things I've noticed is there's sort of an echo chamber effect--if it doesn't have a lot of pretty pictures or if it's not interesting, yet is significant, it will be completely ignored. Specifically, international law in the second resolution on March 9th, 2003. Katherine Gunn leaked a memo from the NSA, from Frank Koza, saying to spy on the U.N. It went largely ignored here in the United States. It's kind of exploding right now, because they dropped the case on her last week, and also she was bringing forth evidence from the attorney general there saying that the war with Iraq would be illegal.

Now, this has to do with the second resolution, and also in general covering things that are not necessarily salient or interesting to the general public, but in actuality are the difference between war and peace. In this case, there's a lot of stuff still developing in Britain and around the world. Why are we not taking the U.N. seriously with this second U.N. Security Council resolution, when 1441 gave no explicit authorization for war, wasn't passed under Chapter 7, and did not explicitly give authorization to go to war, and legal justification going back to the 1990 resolution is kind of ludicrous? So that's my question.

AMB. KIRKPATRICK: I would just say that the reason that there's been so little attention paid to the news that the British have been accused of spying on the secretariat is that inside the United Nations--during the Cold War when I was there, and I'd like to think that it's different and better now, but that news didn't make me think so. There was absolutely ubiquitous spying of countries on each other, and on the secretariat, and the secretariat on the countries. You may not want to believe this, and I didn't want to believe it either.

I'll say a word about the second resolution. You seem to feel that the dominant interpretation of the U.S. government and the Brits and so forth of resolution 1441 was not reasonable or sophisticated or plausible. But that resolution that was passed as the basis of the ceasefire in 1991 ending the first Gulf War had been repeatedly, 17 times, utilized as a basis for attacks on Iraq over their bestial mistreatment of Kurds and Shiites. So there was a very widespread view that this resolution was still operative, that it was relevant, and that it was, therefore, appropriate to be cited on this occasion.

MR. HITCHENS: I think I understand the questioner. Actually, I think I also understand where, as people say, he's coming from. And actually, I think the chairman would be within his right to say it's nothing to do with our discussion. But it's too interesting, perhaps, to let go. I could introduce you to a leading United Nations arms inspector, I can't give you his name now without his permission, but what I can do is tell a story from him. The Foreign Minister of Iraq offered him a very, very large bribe to condition his report to the U.N. inspector. After all, Iraq and its treasury were the

personal property of a psychopathic crime family, as we've since had every reason to find out.

We know what they were doing with the oil for food program. We know that when the Saddam money was recalled by the coalition authorities to be replaced with money that didn't have the criminal's face on it, they thought from the records in the central bank they should probably print 3 1/2 trillion dinars to cover what was in circulation. Five and a half trillion dinars came back, because different members of the family and the party had the right to print their own. This meant there were enormous slush funds around the world, which by the way were a security threat in themselves, because a lot of stuff can be done with money. This is just the dinars, not the dollars.

If I was Mr. Blair, I would want to be absolutely sure I knew what every delegation at the U.N. was doing if approached with bribes by Iraq. I'd want to know very strongly. I'd say, don't you come back and tell me you can't find out, and don't tell me that it doesn't happen in the Secretary General's office, because it has been done. That's what intelligence services are for. And remember, the people with your tone of voice, sir, are always telling us how sinister it is that the FBI and the CIA couldn't find out what was going on before 9/11, and some people have even gone to the length of saying that incompetence was so great that it rises to the level of treason. So you can't have it both ways.

To your point about the resolutions, since the no-fly zones were instituted in 1991, in every sense we have been in a state of war with the Saddam Hussein regime. My book is called *The Long Short War* for that reason. It never stopped, hostilities were never broken off. The only insufferable thing was that for the last few years we were co-governing Iraq with Saddam Hussein. Iraq could not go on half-slave and half-free. If you're sorry it wound up this way, I'm sorry for you. Bye now.

MR. HALTZEL: I just disagree fundamentally with one of your premises. Was the war illegal? As I tried to say in my opening remarks, and let me elaborate for a minute or two on it, it's just totally fallacious to equate the supposed necessity for a U.N. Security Council resolution with the sum total of international law. I have to tell you, our friends in Europe who criticized the United States for going to war without getting a Security Council resolution were suffering from a case of collective amnesia. Four short years before, the Europeans went to war on the side of the United States against Slobodan Milosevic in the former Yugoslavia--and without a U.N. Security Council resolution, because we knew that the Russians were going to veto any resolution for their buddy Slobo. So this is nonsense.

Let me be even more blunt. I think the Iraq war was a judgment call, it could have gone either way, but that's irrelevant to my point. For the vast majority of American policymakers, as I said, a U.N. Security Council resolution, if we need to go to war, is desirable. But if, as a last resort, the United States feels it has to resort to force of arms, the idea that we would submit to a veto of an undemocratic regime in Beijing and a semi-democratic regime in Moscow is, I'm afraid, ludicrous.

QUESTION: I was wondering, to what degree do you think American economic power is a factor in all of this and plays a role in the ongoing war on terror? After all, they attacked the World Trade Center, not the Statue of Liberty. They were attacking economic wellsprings of power.

MR. HITCHENS: Well, that's certainly not true in the case of the plane that came down in Pennsylvania, which was almost certainly destined for the Capitol or the White House, we're pretty sure it was the Capitol. I think it was in a joint session that day, that's where we make our deliberative arrangements. I know in some ways it is a bit of a stock market and a bit of a bordello, but it is still where we have our deliberative discussions. As for the White House, the White House has been a massage parlor in its time as well as a not-so-cheap motel. There was also an election going on, a primary that day. Probably they wouldn't have known or cared about that, but I do. Trade, by the way, is what we believe increases prosperity. They may even think the more poverty they can spread, the more jihadism they can get away with. I think that probably would be right from their point.

MR. HALTZEL: I would just add that I really do hope the Europeans join us in this grand project of attempting to aid the greater Middle East to transform itself. It's not only to democratize, but also it's to point up what Christopher just said, that trade and free market economics, ultimately, are the best vehicle for getting the largest number of people to have decent lives. And this is absolutely essential. But the United States, because of its economic strength, is a lightning rod for all sorts of malcontents around the world. Just look at every time the G8 or the IMF meets. It's a traveling road show. You can see some of the same demonstrators in different cities. There's just a lot of ignorance out there. And I repeat that on this initiative, which I think is going to be tremendously exciting, we ought to give some consideration to exposing the abject ignorance in the United States and around the world on topics as fundamental as capitalism.

MR. HITCHENS: Let me just say one more thing, the first intercepted plots to use airliners as cruise missiles was actually an Algerian splinter group that planned to fly one into the Eiffel Tower, not a commercial target. Furthermore, I recently was in the holy shrines of Shiia Islam in Karbala and Najef, the most recent target of the Wahabi suicide bombers, and I can assure you there's not much money-changing going on in those temples. So remember the point I was making in the first place. This is a war for civilization, in my opinion. It's not a clash of civilizations, necessarily, but it is a clash about civilization and within the Islamic civilization. And we have every interest, as do millions of Muslims, in making sure that the barbaric side doesn't win it.

AMB. KIRKPATRICK: I just have to say, and this is something I don't think most Americans really face the reality of, that the other side, the other civilization, could win. And our civilization, our society, with all of its freedom, its opulence and affluence, and its many, many strengths, could lose.

MR. HITCHENS: It was also going to be the Lincoln Tunnel, and the Holland Tunnel in the second '93 World Trade Center attack. Sorry, I keep remembering more.

QUESTION: It seems to me that looking at America and its role in the future, we deserve at least to say something about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Would one or all of you comment on that?

AMB. KIRKPATRICK: What always strikes me about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, particularly if I'm thinking about the broader context of the world simultaneously, is what keeps the United States on the side of Israel--of course, simply that Israel is part of our civilization. Israel is a foundation on which we have built our civilization. It's not the only foundation, but it's one of the important foundations. And it's unique on that foundation. I think that's perhaps why, if you read bin Laden's many memos to us over the last few years, he tells us again and again: we ask ourselves why people attack us, why they hate us, the answer is that we're arrogant, and that we're rich, and that we've sold ourselves to this corrupt society.

MR. HITCHENS: Well, actually, I wasn't going to start like this, but that's a perfect way of taking you up. Bin Laden's big manifesto calls for the restoration, basically, of the 1918 caliphate, and recalls to his customers, to his audience, that in the year that the caliphate was lost, it was also the time of the Balfour declaration of the Sykes-Pico secret agreement with Anglo-French diplomacy to carve up the Middle East.

It's a bit of a non sequitur from his point of view because the United States government opposed the Sykes-Pico Agreement and the secret diplomacy. That's what Woodrow Wilson's 14 Points were promulgated for-- to show that the United States didn't agree with that kind of colonial conduct. And actually for a very long time, American diplomacy was very skeptical about the Balfour declaration and indeed the whole Zionist enterprise, fearing, I think with every wisdom, that it might be extremely destabilizing in the Middle East and might actually be an unfeasible project. It's a very recent solidarity, I'm afraid, Ambassador, between the United States and Israel.

AMB. KIRKPATRICK: I'm just telling you what bin Laden said.

MR. HITCHENS: But you began by saying it was a building block of our civilization, nonetheless.

AMB. KIRKPATRICK: And I believe that.

MR. HITCHENS: It's not true. I don't say it's not true. It's not true in the way you phrased it. It's quite a recent element of our structure, if you will, our moral structure, and there's nothing in it that says that there should be an Israeli colonization of the West Bank or Gaza. After all, it cannot be for Israeli security. Surely, no Jew will say I know how I can make Jews safe--I think the settlement in Gaza would be the most secure thing we could do today. Obviously not. There must be something Messianic and expansionist at work here, as I believe there is. I think it's a very great national interest to the United

States in any case, and as a matter of principle. There should have been a Palestinian state many years before. And that's for its own reasons. It's a good case in its own terms. But it wouldn't stop bin Laden.

And, by the way, don't forget that the al Qaeda forces are very often largely mustered originally, not from Palestine or anywhere near it, but from Kashmir, from Chechnya, and from the riff-raff of the Saudi Arabian ruling class.

MR. HALTZEL: It's an extremely good question, and one hears this whenever one talks abroad. Obviously, the Israeli-Palestinian debate is central. Two points. Number one, the accusation that the United States, however much it supports Israel for a variety of reasons, is uncritically supportive I think is just false. I mean, in 2000, in an election year, Clinton at Camp David, and later at Taba came exceedingly close to getting an agreement, of dotting the I's and crossing the T's, and it was rejected by Arafat, which I think was a mistake of almost criminal proportions.

But the more important point is about the differences between attitudes in Europe and the United States. This is hard data. The German Marshall Fund of the United States commissioned a brilliant study that came out last September on attitudes in seven European countries, six of them in the EU, plus Poland, and in the United States, on a variety of issues in cooperation with an Italian and a Portuguese foundation, and done, I think, with the Gallup organization. It was highly professional.

With regard to the Israeli-Palestinian dispute, there are two tremendously interesting questions. One was: how important is it to you that the state of Israel is the only real democracy in the area? Well, in the United States it was important or very important, 83, 85 percent of the respondents. In the European countries it was in the mid-40s. That didn't surprise me so much, but the other one I found rather shocking. A two-part question: would you be in favor of exerting strong pressure on the Israelis to withdraw their settlements from the West Bank? In the seven European countries it was something like 82 percent, in the United States it was 80 percent. Statistically almost identical. And would you be in favor of using extreme pressure, the same wording, whatever it was, on the Palestinians to stop suicide attacks? The United States, 80 percent; Europe, 45 percent. That's not situational ethics, and this was an absolutely reputable study.

I think we're talking past each other. Whatever we may think of settlement policies and incompetence on the Palestinian Authority's part, and all this may be true, there are some fundamental differences in attitude.

QUESTION: I'm just wondering, this is sometimes portrayed as the New Cold War, or what replaces the Cold War, sort of an organizing principle for U.S. foreign policy. And I'm just wondering, especially with this panel, if you could tell us how you think this is like the Cold War, how you think it's different from the Cold War, what would constitute victory this time around, and how you think public perceptions or rather

the larger debate within the foreign policy establishment is like or unlike the debates we saw during the Cold War?

AMB. KIRKPATRICK: The Cold War, as I understood it, was a conflict based on some very real, identifiable, and important differences in the views about the way societies should be organized, and colonies should be organized. Marxist Communists' ultimate principles of organization of society and economy gave absolutely no importance to individual freedom and very little importance to the standards of living and the well-being of individuals--little importance to individuals, period. In other words, there were a wide range of differences on very important issues. And there was this kind of habit, almost, on the Soviet side of regularly using force to achieve goals. And also keeping some very bad company.

I would like to say just another word about this Israeli-Palestinian issue, and I agree entirely with what Mike Haltzel said about Bill Clinton's efforts in the final stages of the Oslo Accords, and how hard he tried and we tried, and how close we all thought he came, until Yasser Arafat stood up and walked off. And then a principal assistant explained later that if they had to do it again, they would do it again, because for them the Oslo Accords had been a Trojan Horse, which, like the Trojans, would be used to enter the country and having entered it, to dismount, as it were, to climb out and take possession. And there would be no compromise on the issue of returning the refugees.

If Arafat hadn't found that issue, he would have found another issue, I think, because he was certainly not available for solving a conflict and accommodating Israel. I think Arafat has personally contributed significantly to many of the most dreadful and persistent conflicts of our time. And this was just the most recent and most important.

MR. HITCHENS: Professor John Kenneth Galbraith has a reminiscence of being involved with the early days of the American military government in Germany after 1945 and to have been present at the interrogation of Herr von Ribbentrop, Hitler's foreign minister. The question they were most interested in asking Ribbentrop was this: why did you declare war on the United States when you were already at war with Britain and with the Soviet Union? After all, remember, the United States never declared war on Hitler, I think rather to its shame. We left it to Hitler to declare war in its solidarity with Japan. And Ribbentrop stirred a bit. After all, he had been in charge of the foreign ministry. And he said, well, we thought we had nothing to lose. We knew that Washington and Roosevelt were already totally controlled by the Jews. Galbraith thought, well, you remember the New Deal--it didn't run exactly like that. But Ribbentrop then, perhaps thinking that his answer wasn't as fully polished as it might have been, added: and then, of course, there was the matter of our treaty obligations to Japan. At which point, Galbraith said, well, why was that the one treaty you decided to honor.

Why am I telling you all this? Because, the Nazis lost the war partly because they were fascist, if you see what I mean. Their world view was insane, it was irrational. They were doomed to make terrible mistakes. In fact, it was probably a very big mistake to

invade the Soviet Union in the first place. If you're going to do that, you might get away with it. You won't get away with it if you declare war on the United States meanwhile.

I don't remember the Cold War this way. The Cold War and the arms race were two different things. The areas of contestation were three: the Stalinization of Eastern Europe by the Soviet Union, which could not be accepted and couldn't last, but which they regarded as a war gain, as the prize of their victory; a big argument in the Third World about which was the best model, the socialist or capitalist; and an arms race which could have gone out of control and was partly irrational, but was conditioned by the Cold War. It was very dangerous.

No side really, with the exception of Cuba, made any real stupid move that would have led to the use of nuclear weapons. You could more or less deal with the Soviet Union thinking they wanted nuclear war about as much as we did, and they could estimate the idea pretty much as we did. And in some of their choices in the Third World, the Soviet Union made intelligent choices. It was for Mandela, for example, early on. It was for Ho Chi Minh early on. They were quite smart.

Well, which of the two reminds you of fighting against the Jihadists? Obviously, this is much more like fighting fascists. They don't have a rational calculus, and if they can get a hold of a weapon of mass destruction, they wouldn't keep it to themselves. So, it's as unlike the Cold War as it could be, and it's more like the worst moments of the arms race. It's as if we were in the arms race but with the Axis, or something like that. The worst of both worlds.

MR. HALTZEL: Yes, I couldn't agree more. That's really a terribly important point. Fascism, it seems to me, is unfortunately the most persistent ideology to come out of the 20th century. You see elements of fascism all over the world in various disguises, and bin Ladenism is only one of them.

To contrast and compare, as you asked, it may have been a little easier for the public to grasp the challenge and the threat of communism right after World War II. After all, as Winston Churchill said in Fulton, Missouri, from Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an Iron Curtain is descending upon Europe. And behind it lay the ancient capitals, and he recited them. It was abundantly clear to anybody who lived from 1945 to 1948, when Czechoslovakia went, that this was a power grab, they got territory. That's easy to comprehend. There clearly was an ideology there, however wrongheaded, that did command the allegiance of, unfortunately, many Americans.

I think this is something we ought to look at. That's why I was so intrigued with Christopher's secret army metaphor. I would not have thought that the domestic threat in the United States was anywhere near as numerous today as it was in the communist time. Joe McCarthy may have wildly invented and lied and all that. Nonetheless, there were a lot of people at certain points who were sympathetic to communism, and some of them who actively aided and abetted the enemy.

I guess what I'm trying to say, and this is perhaps one of the best arguments for the CPB initiative, is that I think we don't know our enemy as well as we knew communism, and we have to learn about it.

QUESTION: Could we talk more about the Saudi role in all this? What exactly is being done to change our relationship with the Saudis?

MR. HITCHENS: There's a very good book by Stephen Schwartz--I recommend it--called *The Two Faces of Islam*, which has one of the better anatomies, I think, of what the Saudi ideology is. Wahabism is, as well as a religious heresy, a sort of ideology. It has a plan for how to run society. And for a long time before 2001, I was saying we were sleepwalking because the Saudis had won the reputation of being moderate Arabs. So the fact that they were spending money to spread the word of Wahabism everywhere, from Indonesia to the Palestinian refugee camps to being the paymasters of the Taliban--and one of the few governments in the world that recognized the Taliban as the real government of Afghanistan--was totally and hopelessly underestimated by us. They also tried to move in on Bosnia and Kosovo, where the local Muslims turned them back because they hate not just Shia Islam, but Ottoman Islam, too.

The situation now is, obviously, they've been caught and they know it. I don't think that my neighbor Prince Bandar--at least one of his houses is next to mine--has quite the clout he used to have in Washington. I think that's about high time. It's appalling the way that the Senate would fawn on the guy. That's over, and it's a good thing.

The unspoken point of regime change in Iraq, the thing the administration could not affirm, but I can affirm for you if you'd like, is that a good reason for removing the Saddam Hussein regime was a punishment to Saudi Arabia. They wanted to keep Saddam Hussein as a buffer state, particularly against the Shia, the population inside their own borders they fear. They didn't want the United States to use its own bases, which were built for the defense of Saudi Arabia, to get rid of Saddam Hussein. They don't want Iraqi oil coming back on stream because it breaks their monopoly. Well, Iraqi oil is going to come back on stream now, and I hope the Saudi monopoly gets well broken, and I hope we make more alliances with other states in the region--such as Qatar, which even though it has a Wahabi ruling family does allow women to vote, run for office, and drive cars, and it does have a lot of natural gas--and that gradually the Saudi oligarchy is cut down to size and then we encourage all of the forces within Saudi Arabia that are opposed to it, and we say that every time a Wahabi mosque or madrassa is opened in any part of the United States, we want either a church or a synagogue or a study of secular humanism center to be opened in Saudi Arabia, because at the moment they can do this here, but the practice of all religions except Wahabism is punishable by death in Saudi Arabia. From now on we say you get nothing until you trade. We should have said this years and years ago.

MR. HALTZEL: Well, this is, in a sense, a parallel to the Cold War question. Lenin said, use the freedom of democracy to undermine democracy, and the Saudis are

essentially saying the same thing. We want the freedom to proselytize, propagandize, but you can't do it in our country.

I agree with you about the Saudi role in Europe. During the Bosnian war, I remember vividly going into the Bihac pocket, which had been under siege for 1,200 days, just after it was liberated by the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and sat down with the mayor of this little village. The place was still burning. And I looked at the back of his desk, and there was this huge green and gold plaque. I was pretty sure it was the Saudi Foundation. I asked him. He said, oh, yes, they were here yesterday. It was absolutely unbelievable. And if you go to downtown Sarajevo, there's this huge mosque that the Saudis built. It looks like sort of an Islamic Disneyland; it's just monstrous. But you're perfectly right. To their everlasting credit at the last Organization of the Islamic Conference two years ago, the Bosnian Muslims were the only country, other than the Malaysian host, to vote for the resolution condemning suicide bombings. So they have resisted. They have a several-hundred-year tradition that seems to be resisting. But the Saudis are ubiquitous.

QUESTION: Two points. One is, I'm very interested in Iran, and I've wanted to do a film on it in terms of the human rights movement, the student movement, which I would say is a long 50-year continuum to try to establish democracy there. So I'm so glad that Christopher mentioned Iran. Ambassador Kirkpatrick, I would like to get your reaction, because I think that's one of the kingpins to push to democracy, especially with the whole nuclear issue.

The second is France. I have just a personal reaction to the banning of head scarves or yarmulkes or crosses. I think it's really going to be counterproductive and foment a lot of hate and resentment. And I'm curious to know your opinion and why you think it came up in France that way.

AMB. KIRKPATRICK: A comment first on why I think it came up in France. It came up because one of the most important aspects of contemporary French culture associates the republic with secular laicism. *Laïcité*, the French say. And they guard that *laïcité* in the schools with some passion. And the largest demonstrations in France in the last decades have been demonstrations about whether there should be any use of public funds to subsidize Catholic schools. Far, far, far more French turn out for demonstrations protecting *laïcité*, the secular quality of the French schools, than ever turn out for any religious occasion. They care about it. It's got a long tradition, hundreds of years. So what do I think? I think that's just the French being French. That's very, very deeply embedded in the French culture. Does that answer your question?

QUESTION: The counter productiveness of it--

AMB. KIRKPATRICK: Well, you know, the French reserve the right to define counter productive for themselves.

MR. HITCHENS: If you live long enough, this is what will happen to you. Salman Rushdie used to stay in my apartment when he was on the run. And the other night I had to sit in the same chair the grandson of Ayatollah Khomeini, Hossein Khomeini, the last remaining one in the male line, actually. He's a junior cleric, but he has some charisma, you might say. He has his grandfather's eyebrows, also. And he's recently moved from Qum to Karbala by way of Baghdad on the news of the liberation of Iraq, as he insists upon calling it. He wants the 82nd Airborne to come to Tehran and get rid of the mullahs. I had to break it to him that they're not coming. But I think that's the other hinge country affected by regime change, apart from Saudi Arabia and Iraq. He's obviously in Iraq, because 25 years is enough to prove that diminishing returns are the best you can say for theocracy. It's a dead end. Most of the gifted Iranians have either left the country or want to leave. The economy is a shambles; the revolution is a failure. We can hope for great things, though, I think.

QUESTION: And the population is very young.

MR. HITCHENS: It has a very young population, and a very, very pro-American one. The Iranian street is embarrassingly pro-American. It likes all the things about America that people like you and I find slightly yucky. Well, it's healthy in a way. From where they are, it would also be a step up.

QUESTION: And I think the Internet is the way they organize, like Khomeini had--

MR. HITCHENS: Tremendous communications along that score.

No one has a higher opinion of Jacques Chirac than I do, and I think he's a fawning, posturing jerk. It shows in this case, too. This is nothing more than pseudo-republicanism. It's a gesture to the *laicité* Ambassador Kirkpatrick mentioned. It's Chirac's attempt to fend off the charge from Le Pen, who's always been his problem on the right. And you can tell, because they say headscarves are banned, but only oversized crucifixes or yarmulkes or stars of David are. And then they forgot to say anything about Sikh turbans, because they didn't care. It's a demagogic improvisation. It won't convince anybody. And it really upsets me, because I do care about keeping God out of the schools.

MR. HALTZEL: I don't want to be cast as a defender of Jacques Chirac, but let me at least give you one of the reasons that the French give. I actually haven't heard this publicly, but I've heard it from French officials, and, of course, the laicism argument is exactly right. They claim, at least, that the scarf decree is to a large extent intended to sort of offer state protection to younger French Muslim women who want to be Westernized but feel a tremendous amount of pressure from parents and older brothers, particularly in the suburbs around Paris. I can't say whether this is true or not, but I do think we should at least acknowledge that it's a possibility. They don't want to go public by saying this. That would only inflame the situation more.

QUESTION: Looking at all of this I'm fascinated by all the threads. But we haven't talked about the Internet and technology and how it is in fact changing the world, or about one of the greatest forces of instability in the developing world and in some of the largest populated parts of the world, HIV/AIDS. Are we really looking, or should we be looking, at the larger problem of instability, not just in the Islamic world but throughout Asia and Africa?

MR. HALTZEL: Well, I can come to a connection between 9/11 and the Internet and technology a whole lot better than I can see the connection between 9/11 and AIDS, except that you can learn a lot more about AIDS and HIV and how to combat it from the Internet than you used to. The fact is that there's been sort of a technological leapfrogging. I don't know how to say this in a politically correct way. Civilizations that have not been able to create airliners or the Internet or things like that nonetheless have fanatical members who can utilize them to destroy the civilization that created them. That's the salient fact, and it's unfortunate. I think we have to just be aware of the fact that the people opposing us are, in the main, very technologically capable, and this is a real problem for us.

HIV/AIDS? Yes, it's a security problem for all of us. The U.S. Congress, the administration, has recognized that with the Millennium Challenge Account. It's a drop in the bucket, but it's a step in the right direction.

MR. HITCHENS: I remember getting a fax in early '89 from Tiananmen Square, from a group of the students. They were able to start faxing things to some journalists. And I thought, that's extraordinary--a fax from Beijing in the middle of a rebellion. It means censorship is over. No regime could technically do it now. You couldn't have a *Nineteen Eighty-Four* state any longer. And I had no idea, of course, that one would be getting emails from Baghdad within such a short time. Of course, for a long time that was very, very difficult, and dangerous, and the satellite dish was death a year ago. Don't let us forget. On the other hand, they keep trying to take them down in Tehran, and they fail. The more they try, the more it cheers me up, because you know which way it's going to break.

MR. PACK: I thank you all. Anyone have a question on the grantmaking process?

QUESTION: I don't mean to be impertinent, but in the document, item 6-A, it says that this half-day pre-proposal conference will ensure the prospective applicants are clear on the initiative's objectives, criteria, and procedures. And I see that the reception is supposed to start in 14 minutes, so I'm hoping that we'll get a lot of information in the next 14 minutes.

MR. PACK: Well, this is not the only way to get clear answers on these questions. We are available to answer questions by e-mail and by phone, for the duration. We wanted to take advantage of this distinguished panel, not to guide you specifically, but to give you some sense of the range of possible ideas. So it's true that we squeezed the grantmaking discussion to make room for the content discussions. Maybe that's a

Corporation for Public Broadcasting bias, I don't know. But I'm anxious to make sure that anyone who has a question, is answered one way or another, either today or in the future.

Okay. There's a question over there.

QUESTION: This is about taboos, so that one doesn't wind up going down on a fool's errand. In the late '80s and early '90s in Philadelphia, I was at a lot of different little events with Daniel Pipes and Steve Emerson. And these guys were saying these very crazy things about untoward things happening in mosques. If you tried to bring that out into the mainstream media, you were really considered an oddball or crazy. This isn't so much about the actual grant process, but how are you going to deal with what will be very controversial and upsetting kinds of information?

MR. PACK: That's a very good question. It is the case, of course, that Steve Emerson did produce a public television documentary that received significant funding from the Corporation for Public Broadcasting. So, even taboo subjects were acceptable then, and continue to be permissible on public television airwaves. Furthermore, we created this initiative precisely to allow provocative views, by having a large number of shows funded that can truly cover a range of views, and I think the initiative will fail if it doesn't do that.

There's nothing wrong with the center, but we want to have views from the left, from the right and those not easily categorized. That is a central goal of this initiative, and that is one of the reasons we will fund Crossroads shows at a higher level, to allow that kind of controversy and provocative ideas. So we welcome that. Some taboo subjects have been suggested by the panel, but you can pick the taboo of your choice. Nor are you limited to the panel's particular taboos.

QUESTION: Is that to say there are no taboo subjects?

MR. PACK: There are no taboo subjects. It is true that we do demand that every program meet CPB standards of journalism, that it be objective and fair, that it be fact-based. We will not accept wild, unsubstantiated hypotheses where the other side is not heard from. But there is no taboo subject, and there is no taboo point of view within the bounds of responsible and serious journalism.

QUESTION: No naked breasts. (Laughter.)

MR. PACK: There are some things we don't have to worry about quite as much in public television. Way in the back?

QUESTION: I noticed that you have grant parameters for the first and the third phase, but not for production. Is there a maximum production budget?

MR. PACK: We would expect the budgets to be in keeping with the standard range of budgets in public television. Lower is always better when it comes to budgets,

but we are expecting budgets to be within the norms. And that said, we will look for high-quality programs. And I'm a believer that one of the things that enables public television programs to achieve high quality is that we give producers the resources to spend the time and effort to do it well. Still, the parameters are the standard ones.

QUESTION: Will you talk a little bit about the broadcast goals for this initiative? It seems like this is not a new strand, for example. Most producers know the difficulties of placing one-offs into the national program schedule. And if you could just talk a little bit about how you anticipate or hope or plan that that will roll out?

MR. PACK: That's a good question, though the broadcast aspect of it is far into the future. These programs, as you know, take a long time to develop. But we are in constant discussions with PBS on this subject. They know that these shows will roll out over a period of years, so I think they are prepared to make space in the schedule. It's hard to be too particular without having particular shows and schedules to discuss.

That reminds me of something I wanted to mention. We are assembling a Station Advisory Group, a board of distinguished people from various stations around the country to help guide us on how best to roll these show out, not only so they get a good airdate, but so that they have a long life post-airdate, and they get the attention that they deserve. And the fact that there's a bunch of them under the initiative, under an umbrella, gives them a chance for a greater impact than any one we would have singly. And that was part of our reasoning for conceiving of the initiative and packaging it this way.

Also, we encourage international partners to join with Americans to participate in this initiative, and we're expecting there to be interest in broadcasting the shows and using the shows overseas, and not just in big European markets that generate revenue, but in the Islamic world, for example.

QUESTION: In reading the R&D section of the RFP, it said that if you receive funding for research and development but not for production, then you can't take your idea anywhere else for two years. Is that a rigid rule, and why?

MR. PACK: Well, the reason for that rule is that CPB believes that if we're investing in the R&D, there has to be some quid pro quo. And we don't want people to develop an idea with CPB funds and take it to public television's rivals. And I think that's very standard in R&D contracts.

QUESTION: What if we're bringing money to it?

MR. PACK: We're expecting to 100 percent fund the R&D process in many cases.

I would like to mention the review process. Before any proposal receives a grant, it will be reviewed extensively by the staff and by, generally, two outside reviewers. This is CPB's standard practice. In addition, we are assembling a special Advisory Board.

Rather than review specific proposals, the Advisory Board will help us determine if the initiative as a whole is meeting its goals in terms of content. For example, we might ask the Advisory Board if the proposals we plan to fund represent an appropriate and broad range of perspectives and fulfill CPB's mandate for diversity. The Advisory Board, in keeping with the principles of the initiative, will reflect a wide range of points of view and backgrounds, from the academic community, media, policy makers and others. When they are selected, we will post their names on our Web site.

QUESTION: Are you looking for a budget for R&D, or do you want us to estimate research and develop costs, or are you just going to say, we'll give you this much?

MR. PACK: We require a R&D budget be part of the proposal.

QUESTION: While topics might not be taboo, some of these issues are hot-button issues and there are advocacy groups and funders that have very strong points of view. How will you try to navigate that challenge?

MR. PACK: As you know, PBS does not permit self-interested funders. The funders will have to meet PBS's standard program underwriting guidelines. In fact, all aspects of the production must conform with PBS standards.

QUESTION: I've been working on a film for two years in Afghanistan, and I assume many of the other producers may be already working on films. How do you plan to or are you going to consider films that are already in production, already funded, et cetera?

MR. PACK: Well, you can apply for production funding during the time specified in the RFP. But we strongly encourage people to apply for R&D funding. In public television, often R&D funding has been used mainly for fundraising. People use R&D funds to travel around and prepare proposals for foundations and corporations. But we would expect and require applicants to use the R&D funding to scout locations, conduct research, shoot a little bit, find a story, and bring it back to us along with a production concept that would be developed into a proposal. So I think that most programs where actual production hasn't begun would benefit from an R&D grant. For the ones in production, you'll have to wait and apply at the specified time.

QUESTION: I apologize, Michael, if this isn't already on the Web site. I haven't read it. But who gets final cut?

MR. PACK: The editorial policies are the standard ones for CPB. The producer has editorial control in exactly the way it always is with Corporation for Public Broadcasting-funded shows.

QUESTION: And as an independent filmmaker, I just want to compliment you on having this event today. I think many of us in the audience agree. Thanks for organizing it. (Applause.)

QUESTION: I'm curious about films which may have their center outside the USA, since obviously your main objective is the American audience. If you're looking at Americans abroad and how they have been affected, do you stand much of a chance of getting your proposal through, or do you want this to have a broader reach?

MR. PACK: We want Crossroads to have a broader reach. I'm assuming that a lot of programs, exactly as you said, will be involved in one way or another exploring the cultures of other countries, or looking critically at their history. I encourage collaborations with institutions and filmmakers in other countries. But, it's not essential. We will evaluate the programs on their merits, but an international partnership or cooperation would surely not be a negative.

QUESTION: You talked about international partners at the dissemination stage. What about international partners at the production stage?

MR. PACK: I was actually thinking of international partners at the R&D and production stages. We think that's a good thing. It's hard to have a window on these cultures without partners who come from these cultures.

QUESTION: A separate initiative to middle school and high school kids is under development. Is there a proposed time frame for that, or stay tuned folks?

MR. PACK: I guess it's more of a "stay tuned." We're working on it now. We have people engaged by CPB who are doing the prep work, talking to people, talking to stations, and exploring exactly how to craft the RFP and what kind of process it should be. But it would be basically similar in broad strokes to the RFP that you have now. It would be a multiphased process. We will set aside significant funds. And in this upcoming history and civics initiative, we will particularly look for technical innovation that will marry video and the Web and interactivity in an effort to truly engage these young people. There's a lot of history on TV--on our air, which we think is the highest quality, and on other networks as well. But in spite of the relatively large number of history programs--many of which are used in the schools--children do not seem to be engaged and learning. So we will be looking for new and creative ways to reach that audience where it lives rather than just repackage adult-oriented history shows for kids. We expect the history and civics initiative will be experimentally interactive perhaps in a way that Crossroads is not. We certainly hope to publish the RFP this fall, but, yes, stay tuned for the details.

Thank you all for coming, thank you for joining us.