

**CORPORATION FOR PUBLIC BROADCASTING**

**AMERICA AT A CROSSROADS**

SMITHSONIAN NATIONAL MUSEUM OF THE AMERICAN INDIAN

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*Transcript by:  
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ELIZABETH WEATHERFORD: Welcome to the Smithsonian National Museum of the American Indian, one of the three Smithsonian museums in New York. We're pleased to have you here today in our precinct and hope that you will have time either today or another time to visit the exhibits upstairs.

My name is Elizabeth Weatherford. I'm the head of the film and video center of the National Museum. This is a national center headquartered here in New York. It has programs in both cities where our museum has buildings, New York and Washington, for as many of you may know, the National Museum is opening its large flagship building on the Mall in Washington in September.

In addition we have a large national program and international program, in which we reach out to native peoples in their own communities to try to deliver the services that a big national institution can offer. This has included touring video festivals, support services for native media makers, and a chance to come to the kinds of programs that are generally reserved, sadly too frequently, to the big museums and the big cinemathèques in the cities.

We are currently involved with film festivals, so we left out for those of you who are interested a program from the past few Native American film and video festivals held here in the museum. I hope some of you will pick it up and enjoy looking at the kinds of program productions that Native directors, producers, scriptwriters, and actors are involved in.

For those of you here in the city, we hope you'll return because we do have series all summer long called "At the Movies," which focuses on the contributions of Indians to cinema. As a National Museum we also are concerned with Hawaii, so we are participating in this year's New York-Hawaiian film festival Pacifica, which is going to be held at NYU. I hope all of you will be interested in these film events because we know you're interested in film.

If you have any additional interest in Native American film, video, radio, inter-media, and news media productions, by all means consult our Web site. It's bilingual, English and in Spanish. It's called Native Networks, or *Redes Indigenas*, and we'd very much appreciate having you as our readers and looking at our work. It extends from the Arctic all the way down to Tierra del Fuego, throughout the Americas.

Now it's my pleasure to begin today's program. We are pleased to be the site for a serious new set of initiatives that hopefully you, the filmmaking community of the United States, will be able to participate in. The Corporation for Public Broadcasting has generously launched a series to deal with problematic issues. So it's my pleasure now to introduce Michael Pack, who is the senior vice president for television programming for

the Corporation for Public Broadcasting, who in turn will introduce today's program proposal initiative and our speakers. Michael?

MICHAEL PACK: Thank you. Thank you for hosting us. I'd like to also thank the people of CPB who put this together and all of our co-sponsors to this event, which includes the Association of Independent Video and Filmmakers, the National Black Programming Consortium, *POV*, and WNET-13, who all helped put the event together.

I want to speak a little bit about the initiative and then I'll introduce the panel. This is a new approach to programming on the part of CPB and I'm happy that you all came to hear us explain why we did it and how we're doing it.

To give you a little background, I came to CPB about a year ago, and when I came I was given the mandate to come up with initiatives in the areas of public affairs and education. My staff and I went around the country and spoke to people in the academic community, the policy community, public television stations, independent producers, independent producing organizations, the PBS annual meeting, wherever we found people interested in public television. And we discovered, perhaps not surprisingly, a broad consensus that America was moving into a new era, in some ways but not others like the Cold War, an era where we are going to encounter a new series of challenges and issues: the post-9/11 world.

We also got the sense from the people we spoke to that television could do better in that arena, that the discussion on television was flatter and narrower than it should be. I think public television's own coverage of these issues has been great, but television as a whole has not approached these subjects with the same depth and variety of, say, the print media. The *New Yorker*, or the *New York Review of Books*, or the *National Review*, or the *Weekly Standard* all featured the kinds of perspectives and points of view that needed to be on the air.

In response to the input from around the country we created the America at a Crossroads initiative, an initiative with which I think you're familiar and have read about on our Web site. Our plan is to set aside up to \$20 million over a few years to fund a group of single documentaries and limited series that deal with the issues facing America post-9/11, ranging from the war on terror, radical Islam, the threat to civil liberties by the Patriot Act, the changing relationship of America and Europe. We want to encourage people to approach these subjects from all genres, not just reportage and journalism but history and science, technology shows, comedy if such ideas occur, someone proposed an animation idea--any genre would be possible. We particularly want a range of points of view, not just from the left and the right but inside and outside the Islamic world and all points of view that need to be aired on television.

And I want to mention in passing, although this is not really the forum to go into it in depth, that this summer we will roll out another initiative aimed at middle and high school kids to teach them American history and civics. This is in response to the problem recognized by Congress and others that American high school students are graduating

without basic knowledge of American history. For example, many don't know what century the Civil War was in, and were unable to identify who fought in World War II. And beyond those fact-based problems, there's a decline in civic awareness. We plan to design an RFP which will invite producers to design innovative and interactive projects that use video, the Web, and curriculum materials to reach students both in the classroom and on TV in different ways.

But our focus today is on America at a Crossroads. We have assembled a panel of distinguished experts and asked them to discuss the kinds of issues that they believe are important in the post 9-11 world. I do not suggest that the panelists will provide explicit guidance or that you have to stick to the topics that are important to them. The initiative itself, and CPB, is very open-ended, but we want to emphasize with the panel that we are thinking of these complex issues in a serious way. Since Crossroads represents a new approach on the part of CPB, we thought a panel discussion by experts would provide useful substance that could serve as an appropriate backdrop for our discussion on the Crossroads initiative's more technical dimension. Each panelist will speak for five or so minutes on the important issues facing America post-9/11, and more particularly on what they believe the American viewing audience need to better understand about the challenges and opportunities ahead.

After the panelists speak individually, I will allow them a few minutes to exchange views on one another's comments, and then they will take questions from the audience, first on matters of substance, followed by questions directed to me and Jim Denton, my colleague here, on the grant-making process. Jim, who is here on the panel with me, has worked with me and the others on the TV programming staff, to develop the initiative. He has a distinguished background in foreign policy and human rights and has helped construct the initiative. So together we'll answer the technical questions.

Let me briefly introduce the panel. You have their bios so I'll just give the merest hint of their accomplishments. First speaking will be Max Boot, who is the Olin Senior Fellow in National Security Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York and is a journalist and frequent contributor to numerous publications, and has written many books, including *The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power*. Walter Russell Mead is the Henry A. Kissinger Senior Fellow for U.S. Foreign Policy on the Council on Foreign Relations. He too has written numerous books and writes frequently on foreign policy issues. And finally, Adrian Karatnycky will speak. Adrian is the Counselor and Senior Scholar at Freedom House, editor of their annual survey *Freedom and the World*, and also a frequent writer on foreign affairs and human rights issues.

MAX BOOT: Thanks very much. Thanks for having me here. Thanks for coming out. I was just telling the guys beforehand that in the future I've figured out a new way to pack all the halls wherever I speak, which is to talk about giving \$20 million to the people who show up. That seems to work.

The good news, from the perspective of the subject, is that I used to be a

newspaper editor, and so I think I generate story ideas fairly easily. The bad news, of course, is that I used to be a newspaper editor and so I'm really a print person, not a TV or film person. So I'm going to leave it to everybody here to make of this what you will, but let me just throw out some story ideas that I jotted down on the train ride here about these big challenges that we face in the post-9/11 world. I'd like to gather them into three basic groupings. The first one has to do with issues related to the Middle East, the second one has to do with issues related to the U.S. military, and the third one has to do with issues related to U.S. political and diplomatic challenges.

Obviously in terms of the first category, issues related to the Middle East, the critical and perhaps decisive issue is the battle that's being waged between liberals and fundamentalists in the Islamic world, between liberals and jihadists. That's the fundamental cleavage, I think, in the Middle East, and that's the big issue that will determine whether the Middle East is going to be breeding parliamentarians or suicide bombers.

I could certainly think of many ways of approaching that story. I think it would be interesting just to focus in on the lives of liberal reformers in a place like Egypt or Kuwait or Saudi Arabia as they struggle to implement some of their ideas in the face of tremendous opposition, just looking at the challenges they face and what kind of headway they're making. I think the good news is that there has been some headway, that there is talk of liberal reform, even in places like Saudi Arabia, which is certainly a departure from pre-9/11 norms, but obviously the region has a long way to go, and whatever we do will pale by comparison with what the people themselves will do. That's, I think, the major struggle that we face.

But I think that there are things we can do to try to win hearts and minds in the Arab world and turn around not only the widespread hatred of the United States but also, and more importantly, antipathy to some of the ideals that we hold dear. We're obviously trying to do those things. We've talked about how to do those in the post-9/11 world. I'm not sure we've done them very successfully. We've tried to start TV stations, radio stations, other approaches, and I think it would be interesting to somebody to really chronicle how we're trying to win this battle for hearts and minds in the Arab world by looking at some of the people in the U.S. government who are really on the front line of this public diplomacy struggle. I think that's one of those areas where we've been weakest over the past few decades. We've been very good at projecting military power but very bad at defending our ideals. How we go about and do that in the years ahead, I think, will be crucial to our success in the region.

Another way to approach this general problem is to focus on two states that I think have a good deal in common, even though they're far separated geographically: Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. We can also put Egypt into the mix as well. These are in some ways sort of crucial states that can go either way. In some ways they're our friends and in some ways our foes. They profess to be American allies but at the same time generate suicide bombers and funding jihadists. I think in many ways the most interesting issue, and the hardest one to deal with in the entire greater Middle Eastern region, is how

you deal with those kinds of states. I think we have some ideas about how to deal with avowed enemies like Iraq or Syria or Iran, or others, or Afghanistan and the Taliban, but we're really stymied by the task of trying to manage relations with these countries that are neither quite friends nor quite foes. I think that's going to be a significant challenge and it's an interesting perspective that I haven't seen examined much on television.

Another part of the larger picture is the battle between Shiites and Sunnis. I mentioned earlier the battle between liberals and fundamentalists, which I think is crucial, but there's also this other huge battle between Shiites and Sunnis, which doesn't get as much attention as the high-profile battle between Islamic fundamentalists and the West, but it's certainly very important. We're seeing that in Iraq now, where so much of the wrath of the Sunni fundamentalists is being turned not upon the Americans, not upon the British, but upon the Shiites, who are being slaughtered in great numbers. This is one of those schisms that I think is vitally important but under-appreciated in the West.

I think there are two great fears about the future of Iraq and the region. One is that it will fail, the other is that it will succeed. And why are people afraid of Iraq succeeding? Part of it is because if it succeeds it will be a democracy, which will hopefully spread liberal values to neighboring states, but also there's a huge fear throughout the Arab world that the Shiites will have another state to run in addition to Iran. A state with a large number of Arabs is actually going to be run by Shiites, which is tremendously destabilizing to countries like Saudi Arabia that have sizeable oppressed Shiite populations. So that's an interesting part of the Middle Eastern picture to look at.

The final thing that I will mention is this. I'm an historian so I'm always interested in the historical line. I think there's a fascinating history of the American relation with the Middle East. To sum up a very complex story about which you can write many books, basically you can divide our challenge since World War II into two different phases. The first one has been dealing with Nasserite nationalism, since the rise of Colonel Nasser in Egypt in the 1950s up until about 1980 or so. Pan-Arabism, nationalism was the chief destabilizing force within the region. Since 1980 the chief destabilizing force has been extreme Islamist ideology. I think it's interesting to look at the way we've dealt with those two trends.

I don't think we've dealt with either one particularly wisely. You can really trace a lot of our problems back to the 1956 Suez crisis, when we stiffed our friends in Britain, France, and Israel and decided to cast our lot with Colonel Nasser, which in my view was one of the fundamental mistakes in American foreign policy over the past half century, right up to our appeasement of the Iranian mullahs in the 1980s on the arms for hostages deal. It's a long, gory story. But I think this is a part of the reason why we're in the pickle we're in today in the region--we haven't promoted our ideals. We've cut disreputable deals with thuggish states like Saudi Arabia and we've not stood up to people who have been militaristically opposing our interests, whether it's the Nasserites or the Osama bin Laden-ites. I think that's a lot of the problem that we've encountered in the Middle East. There's an interesting story that can be told there, and it's not the usual vantage point, or the way it's usually presented.

Let me just move on now to what I think are some of the military issues having to do with the war on terrorism. I think the big one, to put it into overarching perspective, is that the United States is the most powerful military nation in the history of the world. Really, there's no comparison in either absolute or relative terms. Our hegemony is unrivaled on sea, on land, and in the air in conventional combat. But that has pushed challengers away from the conventional battlefield. There aren't too many people who are as stupid as Saddam Hussein and who are willing to fight American forces straight up on the field of battle.

What our enemies are likely to do, and in fact have been resorting to, is the new buzzword, asymmetrical warfare. Basically it's at the high end and at the low end. At the high end, weapons of mass destruction, with nuclear weapons and biological weapons being the ultimate trump cards. At the low end, we face guerrilla warfare, which is what we're now encountering in Afghanistan and Iraq. The real challenge, I think, going forward for the United States is, how do we leverage our huge conventional superiority into dealing with these kinds of threats for which we are not very well equipped and which do not play to our strengths--WMD on the one hand and terrorism/guerrilla war on the other?

I'm working on a book right now on the history of military technology revolutions over the past 500 years. It's basically an attempt to frame in a historical context the debate now taking place at the Pentagon over military transformation. How do we take advantage of emerging military technologies, how do we deal with the changing world situation that we've seen since the end of the Cold War? That's a major debate within the Pentagon, and you see it sometimes reflected in headlines--the cancellation of the Comanche helicopter or the Crusader artillery system. But there are large questions involved here: How do you respond to military revolutions? What kind of military forces does the United States need? What kind of capacities do we need to defend ourselves in the future? There are no obvious answers to any of those questions. It's a continuing debate.

But I think clearly one of the capacities that we have lacked, or need to strengthen, is our capacity to deal with guerrilla warfare and also, concomitantly with that, with nation-building. This has been something where we've been weak. You could certainly approach the whole nation-building issue in a number of ways. I'm interested in the historical side of it. My last book was on the history of U.S. small wars, basically wars against guerrillas. There is a long history and there are certain things that run through it, things we've done successfully in some places and failed to do in others, most spectacularly in Vietnam. One could certainly examine why we've been successful in some places and failed in others, and how we apply those lessons in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, or other places where the U.S. operates today.

And you could certainly look at how soldiers are grappling with these challenges. For example, I'm struck by the number of comments from soldiers interviewed in places like Iraq, saying we never prepared for this. These soldiers were basically trained to deal

with tanks at five miles distance. They weren't trained to run a water treatment plant or to set up an election to select the mayor of a small town. But those are the kinds of challenges that American troops have actually performed for a very long time and the troops of many other nations – Britain and France and others – have performed as well.

I think it's interesting to look at the history of those kinds of nation-building exercises. You can certainly look at what we've done in the Philippines, what we've done in Germany and Japan, what we've done in Haiti, so many others that you can examine and apply those lessons to what we're doing today in places like Iraq and Afghanistan.

It's not only a military challenge, though. I think it's important to stress that there's also a significant civilian side to the nation-building effort. In fact, when visiting Iraq I was struck that we were actually doing okay on the military side. The military was adjusting pretty well. But the Coalition Provisional Authority, the civilian side of the occupation, was not doing a very good job. In fact, some military personnel suggest that CPA stands for "can't provide anything." That's the general view in the military in Iraq.

The question is, why aren't we better at this kind of peacekeeping and nation-building? We've had plenty of experience, not only the long-term historical examples such as Germany or Japan or the Philippines, but more recently in places like Bosnia and Kosovo and Somalia. But we don't really have the institutional capacity to deal with that. I think it could be interesting to consider our experience in nation-building from the early 1990s to the early years of the 21<sup>st</sup> century and see how we've done it in these various places, and what lessons we've learned and not learned. I don't think we've been especially good at applying lessons of nation-building exercises. I believe we could do a better job here.

Let me briefly mention several political issues, which I expect my co-panelists will pick up on as well. Obviously a big one is, how does the United States conduct itself in this new world of threats that may strike without warning? Deterrence and containment, the old strategies of the Cold War, may not be adequate to deal with the dangers we face. How do we confront dangers in places like the Middle East, where we don't have a traditional alliance system like NATO in support? This is the background debate about American unilateralism, which has been raging ever since 9/11.

I think very often this debate tends to get reduced to simplistic slogans that don't really grapple with the complexities or the challenges that our policymakers face. It would be interesting to look at questions like--let's assume the U.S. proceeds multi-laterally, but how are we going to be multi-lateral? How is the United Nations or how is NATO going to serve our interests, to defend our values in places like the Middle East, where they have not traditionally been that strong? Is it possible to reform these institutions? Is there another strategy that can be created--perhaps other multi-lateral alliance structures along the lines of those established in the 1940s? Is it possible to do something like that today? What would that look like? These are not questions with obvious answers, but a lot of people in the foreign policy community are thinking long and hard about them. I think that's something that could certainly be represented well in a

television documentary.

The other high-profile issue is certainly U.S.-E.U. relations, which is an interesting story. Relations certainly seemed to hit a low point last year during the Iraq war. They seem to be rebounding a little bit since, but you can examine the degree to which the “West” still exist--to what extent are Europe and America still united, and to what extent do their interests overlap? I happen to think that they do overlap, but there is a widespread perception in both places that they don't, and I think it's interesting to examine how those emotions play out. I expect you will hear a lot of harsh rhetoric on both sides of the Atlantic and then a little bit of pulling back as both sides realize they need each other.

The final point I'll mention under the heading of political issues is that of humanitarian intervention. I think one of the major issues we've been grappling with in the past decade is how to re-define state sovereignty, which used to be an absolute understanding. As long as you didn't invade your neighbor, you weren't vulnerable to outside interference in your affairs. As we have seen in places like Rwanda, Bosnia, Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere, that formula has been inadequate to deal with the failed and rogue states that we have confronted in the post-Cold War world. There's a lot of debate now about how international law might be redefined, how can we redefine the obligations of the international community. How can we deal with these humanitarian crises so that we can avoid another Rwanda, or avoid waiting as long as we did in Bosnia, or avoid going in half-heartedly as we're now doing in Haiti? Those are all significant issues.

Again, I just raise the issues; I don't offer any answers. I think those are the kind of issues that we need to grapple with as we confront the fallout from 9/11 in the years ahead.

WALTER RUSSELL MEAD: We're at an unusual moment in American life in which a lot of citizens would like to know more about American foreign policy. When I was writing my last book, *Special Providence*, I was talking to my publisher one day, and he remarked that I was writing "an intellectual history of foreign policy." He added that every one of those words is bad from a publisher's point of view, but they're not as bad as they used to be. I guess that's good news.

I really do think this is a moment in American life when people are ready for big-picture work that seriously and intelligently takes on major questions. Obviously that has to be hooked to people's interests and perceptions. That's your job, not really mine.

I'd like to talk about several areas where I think there are some opportunities and interesting things going on that people genuinely would like to know more about. The first grouping is under the general title of American foreign policy. I think people would like to know more than they do about what American foreign policy really is. You hear a lot of talk about trade policy or policy in the Arab-Israeli dispute and this and that, but what's the overall architecture? What is the American project in the world? There are

some historic roots to that. It's related to what the British were doing in some ways. It's a mix. At the one level you have a kind of a security system. You have a sense of balance of power, we're not going to let any hostile power dominate Europe, or we're not going to let any hostile power dominate East Asia. We're not going to let anybody have the ability to disrupt the flow of oil through the Middle East. We're going to try to build an integrated system of trade and finance around the world. We're going to try to build a world community of democratic countries who accept the rule of law in their dealings with their own citizens and with each other, and somehow we're trying to wrap all of that into one big ball. If you find a way to explain that intelligently and coherently, people would thank you and they might even watch your program.

Along this line, American foreign policy is often thought of with 1941 as the year zero, or maybe the year 1948, and before that was isolationism and Americans didn't know or care about foreign policy. In fact, if you look back at American foreign policy and American history, there was tremendous interest right from the beginning, and a lot of it was in terms very familiar to us today. Trade was one of the key issues in American history, and it bothered people. People fought about it in the Washington administration; people are fighting about it in the George W. Bush administration.

The question of globalization and the integration of the American economy into the world system is a biggie. There are a lot of others. If any of you have run across that intellectual history of American foreign policy that so disheartened my poor publisher, *Special Providence*, I talk about continuities. A lot of the arguments we've been having about foreign policy are not new. And if you went and looked 80 years ago, 150 years ago, 200 years ago, you would see real similarities. Wilsonians want to spread American values around the world and think that's the only way we can be safe. Those I call Jeffersonians think we should define our interests very narrowly and try to avoid sticking our nose in where it doesn't belong so we don't get in too many quarrels, and also that we should keep our national security state small to protect our civil liberties. Hamiltonians, as I call them, think that the road to a better world is through greater trade and a kind of a close alliance between government and big business, both domestically and internationally.

And then there are what I call Jacksonians, popular nationalists. I'll explain Jacksonians through one particular episode. I think it was 1818. Andrew Jackson was commanding U.S. forces in Georgia in a battle against Creek Indians, who were based in Florida, among other places. And in Florida, which was then still legally Spanish territory, there were these two British subjects who operated a trading post that was selling arms, ammunition, and other things to the Indians. Andrew Jackson sent U.S. forces across the international frontier, arrested the two English citizens, brought them back to the United States, tried them before a military tribunal, and hanged them. Which is pretty much today everything the European Union hates about the United States and our foreign policy. It's interesting to see that we were doing that when we were weak. It's not something we just waited for until we were the strongest military power in the world. We did that when we were a weak and marginal power. It made Andrew Jackson so popular that his election to the presidency was only a matter of time.

So we've had these kinds of four strands. I think it would be interesting to try to explore how those have evolved, to give people a sense of grounding in these debates that we have.

There's one other thing about American foreign policy overall that's worth thinking about, and that's this. Almost all the people who make American foreign policy and who work on it in a professional way tend to be specialists. That's what our academic system produces. So you have China experts, you have trade experts, you have human rights experts, you have nuclear weapons and strategic arms experts.

But American foreign policy is really about fitting all of these together, and to really do it well, given especially America's role of kind of trying to construct some sort of international system, you've really got to talk about values, you've got to talk about history. If you're the kind of person who thinks the enlightenment can someday achieve the empire of rational perfection and peace, then you're going to think that maybe the UN is the ancestor of the parliament of nations, and we're trying to build a world government, and permanent peace is a real goal. But if you're somebody who believes that original sin dooms all human aspirations and that essentially only God is going to bring about a world of peace, you're going to view the UN or concepts like a new world order very differently.

Well, American foreign policy is about weaving all of this stuff together. And furthermore, even though foreign policy is often dreamed up by experts and technocrats, it ends up being voted on not only in Congress but in national elections, and discussed by people who are not experts or who are experts in different things. So American foreign policy in some ways is what people used to say theology was in the Middle Ages – the queen of sciences. It's the sea to which all disciplines need to flow. Economics, psychology, culture, religion, history, and international relations theory all go into the making of American foreign policy, or need to.

How do we promote both an elite and a public discussion that recognizes this? And another question: Our academic system, our professional system turns out specialists. How can we turn out generalists who are not dilettantes? It's an interesting question and might be worth exploring.

Let me just run down a couple of big themes that might be worthy of your consideration. The first one is just a possibility, but it's worth thinking about. It's quite possible that religion in the 21<sup>st</sup> century is going to play the same role in international politics that secular ideologies did in the 20<sup>th</sup> century. In other words, instead of communism we'll have not just radical Islam but radical Hindu nationalism in India, and in the United States the rise of Christian fundamentalism and evangelicalism that change the way people think about foreign policy. Europe seems to be getting more and more secular while in fact most of the world seems to be getting more and more religious.

All these things are huge. Just to look at another one, people often say, well, how

do we get anybody to pay any attention to Africa? Actually there's a colossal struggle going on in Africa between Christianity and Islam. At some point a line more or less will be drawn across Africa and just about everybody to the north of it will be Muslim and just about everybody to the south of it will be Christian. Does the United States care where that line is drawn? Probably the American people do somewhat care. Should that in any way be an object of American policy? I find a lot of different responses to it. This would be a way to get people to follow this story in a different way, looking at the records of what was originally a faith introduced by missionaries in Africa. At the start of the 20<sup>th</sup> century I think there were something like fewer than 10 million Christians in the whole continent. Now you're looking at close to 400 million and growing very rapidly, and not always the Christianity we're used to here. I think that set of stories is a good one.

Another is this shift in American foreign policy away from Europe as the center of our foreign policy. For almost all of our history, Europe has been the biggest thing we could see. It was the source of the greatest military dangers, the source of the greatest trade opportunities and trade challenges. Europe for much of the last two centuries had its empires that included a lot of the rest of the world, so it was the political center of the world. Then, even though Europe was not at all what it had been in world power terms, the Cold War was essentially over the future of Europe. Whenever anything happened anywhere in the world, American foreign policy tended to ask, how will this affect Europe and the confrontation with the Soviet Union in Europe? That's no longer the case. And probably today in American foreign policy, our center is the Middle East. Anything that happens anywhere in the world, including European politics, we ask ourselves, how does this affect us in the Middle East? East Asia is probably second, Europe third, Latin America fourth, or you could argue about those last two rankings. That's a big change. That's the kind of change that happens once a century or so in the foreign policy of a country.

The stuff that Max is talking about is part of that change. It's deep and profound. It also has to do with the fact that Americans of European descent are further and further away from their European origins and less and less sentimentally moved by them, while people who tend to feel the strongest ties to countries of origin are more recent immigrants, more and more of whom are not from Europe. So things are changing. I don't think we have nearly enough discussion or understanding of this.

Then let me finally talk about two paradoxes in American foreign policy that I think are worth investigating. The difference between a paradox and a problem is that you solve a problem. You live with a paradox. You manage the tensions in a paradox. These are things I don't think will go away.

One of them is sort of the American system and the end of history. Those of you who know Francis Fukuyama's brilliant book know that his idea is that liberal institutions, liberal economic and political values are going to dominate the future because in order to mount a credible military challenge to the United States, you'd have to have a large economy. To do that you'd have to have a very sophisticated economy,

sophisticated people who will demand liberal democracy and liberal economics, or otherwise it won't work. So you have to become a mushy, peaceful, democratic place in order to mount a challenge.

That's clearly not quite the case. As progress goes forward, as the Anglo-American world order creates more economic progress and more technological progress under capitalism, it becomes easier and easier for smaller and smaller groups of people to be very destructive. In the 1940s only the United States, the most powerful, richest country in the world, could build an atom bomb, and to put that together you had to have people like Albert Einstein, the cutting edge of the cutting edge of science. Today, third-rate countries with third-rate scientists can put together very credible WMD (weapon of mass destruction) efforts, and as we've seen from September 11<sup>th</sup>, NGOs (non-governmental organizations) can now wield more power for destruction than great countries used to be able to wield.

So ask yourself this. On September 11, 2001, we saw what an NGO could do. What kind of danger and destruction on September 11<sup>th</sup>, 2101, will we see if scientific progress continues to accelerate at its current rate? And furthermore--this is kind of a cultural Malthusian argument and I'm not sure if it's true, but it's interesting--the rate of technological progress and economic and social change powered by technologies tends to accelerate in the world in a geometric progression. But the abilities of societies and cultures to cope with and adjust to change may be linear. The more successful we are at spreading a technological, liberal world order, and the more successful we are at accelerating the pace of change, the more societies may be unable to cope, which may cause all kinds of al Qaeda-like groups to form in resistance and discontent. So we may actually be headed into a more tumultuous 21<sup>st</sup> century than we had in the 20<sup>th</sup>.

I'll just give you my final little paradox that I don't think we can solve, but we have to live with. And that is, are we trying to build an American empire or hegemony, or are we trying to build a world order that's past all of that empire and hegemony stuff? I think we actually end up having to do some of both. Americans tend to believe, and I think rightly, that in a truly multi-polar world of great power competition and WMD, it's just not safe. It was bad enough when we had the Soviet-U.S. standoff. If you have a lot of nuclear powers, you have kind of an anarchic social system where you have balances of power and all that kind of thing, it's unacceptable. So we have to stop that.

Part of stopping that is to become the world's most powerful country, so that no one really dares to take us on among the powers. That's kind of imperial, and yet at the same time one feels that somehow the system has to rest on consent for it to be durable, and that the cooperation of other countries is needed, and that there has to be a system of international law of some kind. Otherwise it's just naked force, and we get more and more resistance to our system.

How do we combine these? You know, a lot of people think there's an easy answer to this. I don't see it. I don't think either of the extremes work, the pure imperial or the sort of purely consensual commonwealth of nations model. But on the other hand,

how you balance it in between is very difficult.

So I think you have the opportunity to investigate some of the most serious issues of our time, raise real questions, and, who knows, you might even cover some new intellectual ground by taking that on. And again, to close, we're at an interesting moment where a lot of people are actually interested in questions like this. Thank you very much.

ADRIAN KARATNYCKY: I'm glad that my colleagues have taken up the broad array of issues that the third speaker doesn't need to take on. I'd like to examine the problems that we are confronting in this transitional, post-9/11 world from a kind of contrarian point of view, and that is to talk about some of the continuities and the idea that what we are dealing with are forces and events in the world that predated 9/11 by a very long period. We have to remember that even the attack on the World Trade Center followed an attempt that had been made eight years before, so that this was simply the successful continuity of a struggle or war that raised it to a higher level of awareness and of policy priority.

The experience of the American people post-9/11 was fundamentally different from the experience of terrorism in the other advanced industrial nations. Look at the statistics. In the last five years about 30 people have died in terrorist acts in the E.U. countries. That is roughly a mayhem toll of a month in Washington, D.C. So part of the disruption of how we are approaching the world and the fact that America seems out of step is dictated by that rupture in experience and consciousness. And yet people will say that most people experienced 9/11 virtually. But I do think that the immediacy of it, the impact it had on New Yorkers—it occurred in the two centers of the policy elite in this country, or two of the three at the very least--had an important transformational effect on our approaches, our understanding.

This issue has brought to the surface the absence of democratic change, the absence of virtually any change, economic change as well, in the Islamic world. The Arab development report pointed to this situation that has been ongoing for decades – well, for the better part of a couple of decades in the Arab world: no rates of growth, expanding populations, a sense of discontent among the citizenry. The United States and Europe have been engaged over the post-Cold War era in a project of trying to press political and economic liberalization, but they have really exempted the Middle East for energy reasons and other reasons from that project. That is another anomaly that has raised itself to the fore.

In the last 30 years, the number of democratic states around the world has doubled from about 45 to around 90. It depends on whether you talk about liberal democracies or procedural democracies; it's even higher if you talk about procedural democracies. But nothing has changed in the Arab world. All of these states are out-of-step monarchies, one-party dictatorships, military police states, and the like. This lack of change is an intimate and integral part of confronting the world post-9/11. It has raised the agenda of reform, so this is now a high priority of the Bush administration. There is a dialogue now which the Europeans, including the Germans and the French, want to be involved in. I

think that is an important issue to look at.

Another issue where we seem to be out of step is in civil liberties. How is the United States coping with counter-terrorism measures, civil liberties issues, and the treatment of its ethnic minorities compared to other democracies? I think it would be a compelling way to tell the story by taking a look at how European and other increasingly multi-ethnic states are handling this difficult and vexing problem. Is John Ashcroft the worst guy out there, or are there justice ministers and security chiefs in other countries doing a lot of the same things? Have they found other solutions to deal with these matters? Are they doing better in terms of dealing with integrating their Islamic and Arabic minorities? Are there success stories out there that we can learn from? All these kinds of things, I think, are important to know. They're an important counterpoint to an understanding of how the United States is coping.

The architecture and the political geography of terrorism is important. Mercifully, 9-11 has been the only event on that scale perpetrated by terrorists around the world. In terms of scale, no other event is within 10-fold of the mayhem that occurred in that act. In the last five years, including 9/11, about 10,000 people have died of terrorist acts around the world. The countries that are highest on the terrorism list are countries that you don't normally think of. You may think of Russia in terms of Chechnya, but it's actually terrorist acts carried out in Russia. So Russia is the number one victim of terrorist acts, Colombia is number two, and Israel is number three on the list of the most fatalities and acts of terrorism over the last five years.

As I said, there are many areas and regions of the world where this is a dwindling phenomenon. There is terrorism in Western Europe, but democratic terrorists, or terrorists acculturated in the democracies, appear to operate by a different ethic. The ETA, which is a major source of terrorism, gives advance notice of attacks, and apologizes when there are one or two innocent victims. But in most of the terrorist acts around the world, 95 percent of the targets are civilians. That's another interesting issue to explore. It's not the police or military being targeted. Most of these acts target civilians.

If you look at the origins of the terrorists, there is actually an order of magnitude in the kind of mayhem that is visited. People from the most brutalized societies and closed societies tend to be more brutal in their terrorism when they export it, by an order of four or five to one. These are all issues that I think are important to explore.

Finally, the issue of intervention. As I mentioned, the United States may seem out of step in terms of its aggressive post-9/11 response, its excessive interventionism, but really the doctrines of preemptive intervention are in some ways mirrored by the discussions of humanitarian intervention. In the last 10 years liberal democracies, including the Europeans, have commanded basically 91 or 92 percent of the world's resources. Dictators, even China, which is a big engine in all the Gulf tyrannies, account for a very small part of world gross national product, and they don't have the capacity to challenge this in effect hegemony not just of the United States but of liberal states. Look at who was the engine for intervention in Liberia or Haiti. It was actually the French who

were urging a totally reluctant United States to get involved. There was a lot of momentum in other places.

Many people speak about the revival of a colonial relationship. This is an issue that is being hotly discussed, hotly debated within the international community apart from the United States. But look at things like the international criminal court, or the findings of a commission that Kofi Annan encouraged called *The Responsibility to Protect*. All of these are mechanisms that are going to be heating up the pot and creating an environment where powerful and wealthy and technologically advanced democracies are going to be involved in the affairs of failing and rogue states. All these trends were palpable before September 11<sup>th</sup>. All these issues, I think, are worthy of exploration.

I do want to echo one other point, and that is the discourse within the Islamic world, within the Arabic world. I think it's very important to look at the post-9/11 world to assess where democratic discourse is in the Muslim world. It is important because there is a lot of discourse. In some places it has been squeezed to the fringes, but increasingly you can find substantial voices in the establishment--even in places as closed as Saudi Arabia, certainly the ferment in Iran, certainly the democratic transformation of an Islamist party in Turkey into a party that really has moved in a more moderate secular direction. In looking at the post-9/11 world and looking at this crossroads, it is a crossroads as much for the United States as it is for the world. Understanding these issues, clarifying those issues, and, I would argue, contrasting and helping us understand how we fare and how we do in some cases relative to our partners elsewhere in the world, would be important contributions to the American public and I think could make -- but you're the judges of that -- interesting television.

MR. PACK: Thank you. That was a good series of talks. Do any of you want to direct a question to each other? Maybe we should move to the audience questions. Anyone out there with a question?

Q: I was struck by the fact that just about everything that you gentlemen talked about related to the United States in the post-9/11 world in a foreign policy or international kind of a relationship. I'm wondering how much Crossroads' focus is going to be on domestic issues, domestic policy, domestic crossroads, and changes in the country internally, that may or may not relate to our perceptions of our country, what it means, what our role is.

MR. PACK: The Crossroads initiative isn't focused exclusively on foreign policy questions. For example, you can go into questions of American's self-image and domestic questions that relate to how we're responding in a post-9/11 world. I think the gentlemen on the panel posed questions based on their own interest and expertise and pointed to a lot of areas for television programs, on international and some domestic issues. Of course, the panelists' comments are not intended to be exclusive.

Q: I don't have a question but I want to just make a statement if I can. I have a very heavy heart. I'll just say briefly, as an independent filmmaker, when I learned about

this initiative, I had a very different vision of what it was. I found the panel's views asking me essentially to do the bidding of the Pentagon, to look at how American conventional military superiority can be leveraged against guerrilla movements, or to look at the Middle East as a place that breeds suicide bombers, and to talk about how we envision the project of America and the world. And for me, America at a Crossroads is different.

I don't accept that there is only one direction for us to move, and I didn't on 9/11. I was here in New York City, as many of us were, in Union Square--the whole of Union Square was a memorial of candles until President George Bush told us to stop mourning, and the New York police came in and scraped all the candles up and told us to go home. You say it's a crossroads, but there could be on the panel at least one person to raise the question of how do we want to challenge the particular outlook of the Bush administration today, and to say that it is not inevitable, and to say that our job as filmmakers is also to show that the present direction of things in this world is not inevitable. So that's my comment.

MR. PACK: It isn't the case that the points of view of the panelists are the only points of view available to filmmakers who want to participate in this initiative. We are committed, as I said in my opening remarks, to a wide range of views – wider, not narrower, than is conventionally on television. So I think you should hold the initiative accountable to that promise when it's done. When the funding is complete and the shows are aired, see whether we in fact did that.

There isn't one particular point of view that we want to encourage. The panelists were encouraged to speak from their perspectives about what they believe are the key post-9/11 issues. You are certainly not limited by their observations nor do you have to reflect their point of view.

But I will let them respond to the way you've characterized their views, individually or collectively.

MR. KARATNYCKY: In fact I was looking to film as a means by which to compare, contrast, and thus better understand how the US treats its immigrant minorities, particularly Arab citizens and residents, and as opposed to how other liberal democracies cope and manage. I simply observed that this problem confronts many democracies. Some democracies may be handling this well, other democracies may be handling it poorly. We may be at the bottom of the rung, but I think this is an issue worthy of exploration for filmmakers.

As to the origins and breeding grounds of terror, about 80 percent of the 10,000 people who've been killed in terrorist acts over the last few years have been killed, to the extent you could identify the terrorist actors, by individuals who've originated in the Islamic world. That's an empirical fact. And I tried to explain it not because of some inevitability about Islam, but because of the region's democracy deficit, the brutality of the regimes which create a culture of violence, a culture of aggression, and which causes

opposition to strike out violently precisely because they don't have the mechanisms of liberalism, openness, free debate, exchange of views, and tolerance for human rights.

My views were not accurately characterized by your summary.

MR. MEAD: I'll just say briefly that I thought I was posing questions, not laying down inevitable answers. But, if you don't like my ideas, don't make movies about them.

Q: Well, you described the post-9/11 world as reflected in the Bush administration. I wonder if you have any thoughts about whether you'd come up with different ideas if we had a Kerry administration.

MR. BOOT: That's an interesting question. Let's say that John Kerry wins in November. Is there going to be a huge shift in American foreign policy? It's possible there would be, but I would guess there wouldn't be. Very often during a campaign you get a lot of rhetoric, a lot of sound and fury, but it has very little relation to what an administration actually does.

In 2000, for example, George W. Bush ran a campaign that criticized the notion of nation-building, and then, once elected and confronting the realities, has himself become a much more ambitious nation-builder than Bill Clinton. In 1992 Bill Clinton attacked the Bush administration, the first one, for being too soft on China, and he adopted exactly the same policy on China as the Bush administration.

If you look at the broad sweep of American history, you see huge continuities. A lot of rhetoric in campaigns makes it seem as if there are big differences, but in actual implementation of policy, the differences are not that large. You're already seeing this with John Kerry. There is a very interesting shift in John Kerry from when he spoke at the Council on Foreign Relations on foreign policy in December, when he was still in a very heated race with Howard Dean and was trying to win the support of Howard Dean voters. But, when he spoke a few weeks ago at UCLA, when he basically had wrapped up the nomination, his message changed.

Back in December Kerry sounded very much like Howard Dean, denouncing George W. Bush for having the worst, the most ideological and the dumbest foreign policy of all time. Kerry said he was going to go back to the United Nations, he was going to eschew unilateralism, all these kinds of themes that Howard Dean was hitting so hard and were being picked up by a minority of Democratic voters in the primaries.

Now that John Kerry has wrapped up the nomination, he realized he had to move to the center. The Democrats currently have a disadvantage when it comes to the war on terrorism, about a 20-point deficit in the public opinion polls. He's had to become more mainstream in his approach. And therefore, at UCLA he was saying, he would not wait for a green light from anybody else in order to protect American national interests, which is very much like George Bush's unilateralism that Kerry previously denounced.

I can't guarantee that a John Kerry administration would be like a George Bush administration, but I believe there will be many more similarities than differences. In fact, I think the challenges that we face will be there regardless of who happens to be president a year from now, or five years from now. The challenges we're talking about, the systemic problems of the Middle East that breed violence, terrorism, and extremism, are there no matter who's the President of the United States. That's the essential challenge we have to deal with.

If the filmmaker up here thinks that lighting candles is going to deal with that problem, I have news for you. It probably won't. The serious challenge that American foreign policymakers are going to face is how to deal with these realities. And it's a problem to which serious people on both sides of the aisle, Republicans and Democrats, actually come up with very similar answers having to do with promoting democracy, promoting our ideals, even though the rhetoric of the campaign makes it seem like they're very far apart.

MR. MEAD: I tend to agree with Max. I think the changes would be somewhat atmospheric and probably limited. The differences between France and the United States are not just a matter of bad negotiating style by the Bush people, although that has played a role. There are very serious differences in the way the two countries see their national interests. From the Kerry campaign's political point of view, foreign policy is the one issue where George Bush does better in the polls than Kerry, and so their goal is to narrow the difference so that the other, mostly domestic issues where they have more public support, will be more prominent in voters' minds.

MR. KARATNYCKY: The team around Kerry is also the team that was very aggressive in terms of intervention in Bosnia and Kosovo, and willing to bomb Sudan and Afghanistan, and so forth. These are broader issues, but I think these are broader issues of whether it is appropriate for the U.S. as a power to use these kinds of mechanisms.

But specifically in answer to the question, I would say that there is more likely to be continuity in the foreign policy, although again I think there may be an opportunity to improve relations, start anew with the Europeans, not to have the sort of a personal animus that has developed. But other than that, substantively, I don't even think it would be Clinton lite. It would be Clinton 2.

Q: I'd be interested to hear the panelists' thoughts on what are the issues besides foreign policy where we could use some national debate and conversation.

MR. KARATNYCKY: Well, one thing that intrigues me is, to what degree do Muslims and Arabs feel isolated, alienated, and pressured here a couple of years after the event? Are there opportunities for them to feel comfortable and re-integrated into the society, or is there kind of a hidden wall? I think that's a very important problem, because these are two very large and growing minorities in our country. Exploration of that, further from the event, revealing what the nature of that relationship is, would be as

important as anything we have talked about.

Certainly there is the whole range of civil liberties issues. There's a very active debate about the Patriot Act. Are there excessive controls. Is there the emergence of some kind of censorship in the society? All these issues that are eagerly debated certainly are appropriate and should be supported within the context of Crossroads.

MR. MEAD: I think one of the really interesting things going on in the country, you almost have to go back to a sort of class analysis to get at. The New Deal state or Fordist American society was based on a compromise between capitalists and labor. Capitalism accepted a certain amount of state regulation, inheritance taxes, progressive taxation. Labor gave up some control over the work process, which I don't think labor ever really wanted that much. And you had this deal that was mediated by a kind of a managerial group, the experts. You could think about Robert Moses in New York history as the classic expert. And the Progressive movement tried to take politics out of government and so that instead of corrupt urban politicians and their incompetent hirelings, the decisions about infrastructure and social policy generally, even at the federal level, were made by this kind of "mandarinate" -- a technocratic, meritocratic "mandarinate."

What you're seeing, I think, in this country today is very interesting. On the one hand, the old capital-labor competition is not working in the same way due to globalization and a new intensity of competition among companies. A lot of people in the U.S., and quite possibly a lot of people in this room, sort of expected that would lead to a new era of left-right polarization and competition, with dispossessed workers wanting to strike back at capitalism.

Instead, to a surprisingly large degree, what's happened is that both capital and labor have turned against that administrative upper middle class. Whether it's professors or doctors, no one wants experts telling them what to do any more. There's a kind of a resurgent individualism in American society that expresses itself in a skepticism and a hostility to any kind of intermediary group. At the same time we're seeing the economy dis-intermediated. So whole professions like travel agents are going to die out as the Internet allows people to act for themselves. Now if you have a serious illness, before you even talk to your doctor about treatment, you've researched the Internet and you have seven different treatments and you want to be in control of your own treatment.

So the professional middle class, which was basically spared a lot of the agony of the falling wages and downsizing that predominantly hit blue-collar Americans in the last generation, is now getting it. Doctors, lawyers--you're able to do your will over the Internet more easily--accountants. And they're going to be outsourced on top of that too. So, some of the income and equality of America may disappear as the winners of the last 20 or 30 years in the upper middle class start feeling the axe.

I think this is a big story with many ramifications. It comes into many debates over public policy, and I don't think we're really getting the kind of serious attention to

this whole range of issues that the facts justify.

Q: I want to start by giving props to the Anglo-American world order for sending their delegation of five white guys there (on the panel). This whole thing stinks. It's so disingenuous what's going on with PBS. I can't believe this. I want to start off by talking about the conservative Bush administration appointees for the CPB board, who have vocalized that it's okay for them to interfere with programming, and then their first act is to create this \$20 million program that was gutted from other programs, including the Diversity Fund for PBS.

We have here questions framed by a right-wing Republican panel up here about this is what we're going to discuss. I find it highly arrogant. If this goes through, I mean, PBS won't be about public broadcasting.

MR. MEAD: Your opinions are humble.

Q: I'm sorry? Not you, baby. You're a little arrogant up there.

MR. MEAD: First of all, I'm neither right-wing nor Republican.

Q: Regardless if you are, that's what I think you've communicated. What I want to ask is why have--

MR. MEAD: That's what you have decided that I am, in your increasingly humble opinion.

Q: I don't care what--you gave yours; let me give mine. Why has this been framed like this?

MR. MEAD: Because we're evilly trying to destroy public debate and crush dissent.

Q: That goes without saying, baby.

MR. MEAD: We are absolutely out to take away all your civil liberties. Please check them at the door on your way out.

MR. BOOT: And don't forget we're doing the bidding of the Pentagon as well.

MR. MEAD: We got our instructions this morning.

Q: All right, I --

MR. MEAD: It's really insulting. Excuse me, it really is insulting. You can disagree with me all you like, of course, and I expect we do disagree on a lot of things. But this assumption that I'm up to something devious, or that it's somehow wrong, or

that it's a travesty that PBS should be thinking about listening to my ideas, it's really horrendous.

Q: But you're not diverse –

MR. MEAD: Actually Max and I are quite diverse.

MR. PACK: I think this is a good segue to questions to me, actually. I'm proud to have invited these three experts. They do represent a diversity of views and perspectives. In our funding, we will certainly maintain public broadcasting's commitment to diversity. It is not the case that there is only one frame of reference for the shows, as a lot of these questions have assumed.

Send in a proposal. Frame the issue however you wish. I think the panelist's ideas are not just diverse and varied, but interesting and valuable. If you don't agree, develop your proposal for the Crossroads initiative in a different way. That's my invitation to you. The panelists views are not intended to be exclusive or definitive in any way.

Q: Why is that after 9/11, there was a such a disconnect? Many Americans were not as aware of a lot of the world out there.

MR. BOOT: Well, Walter made a correct point, which is that there is a lot more awareness since 9/11. Now obviously people have to live their normal lives and most people are not foreign policy wonks. They have more immediate concerns in their lives that they have to attend to. But the fact that American troops are fighting and in some cases dying abroad tends to concentrate the mind powerfully and tends to focus attention in a way that nothing else does on what's happening abroad. The fact that 3,000 Americans have died as a result of people coming from abroad and killing them tends to concentrate the mind pretty powerfully on what's happening abroad, too.

So I think that there is a moment here, as Walter alluded to, where there is a tremendous public interest, and we're seeing it in the fact that foreign policy has been featured more prominently in the presidential campaign so far than the last several campaigns going back a decade or more. I don't think *Foreign Affairs* magazine is ever going to have a higher circulation than *Reader's Digest* or *Rolling Stone*, but the circulation of things like *Foreign Affairs* have gone up. And by all the kinds of measures we see on the Council on Foreign Relations, people are much more interested in foreign affairs. There's much more awareness of these kind of issues since 9/11. I think that's a real void of knowledge, though, that can be filled by the filmmaking community, or those of us who write or whatever the medium we communicate in.

MR. MEAD: I would add that, foreign policy is this incredibly complex subject. The questions are often very simple – should we invade Iraq or shouldn't we invade Iraq? But the ways that people come to their answers can be very complex. It's a big world with a lot of countries in it. There's a lot going on.

I had the unhappy experience last summer of reviewing leading textbooks in world history for a lot of schools, and basically my conclusion--this is not ideological, I think, although maybe some people will tell me it is--was that most of these things are overwhelmingly boring. They're so thick, and they take all the good parts out. You get Roman wars of conquest, but not gladiators fighting beasts in the Coliseum, or the fruitier exploits of some of the Roman emperors. So I think a lot of kids come out of these kinds of programs thinking, boy, the world's been going on a long time and a lot has happened, and most of it is pretty dull, and I'm never going to understand it. It's too much.

This is partly, by the way, because unfortunately now people have gotten this idea that every culture has to receive an equal number of pages, and to imply that some matter are more important than others is disparaging. So the books just get thicker and thicker in response to these different groups coming in, from the right as well as the left--it's not ideological. So you end up with what C.S. Lewis described in one of his mythical kingdoms--that the history book is duller than the truest book and more wildly false than the most romantic novel you've ever read.

So we've lost sight of the facts that schools should be encouraging kids to take an interest and that learning has to be lifelong. We're throwing indigestible material at them, often badly taught, certainly I can tell you excruciatingly poorly written, and we're reaping the results of that to some degree.

Q: I have some probably rather dull logistical production questions I'd like to ask, as much as I've enjoyed the conversation. I came in here with a number of ideas, some of which I think are reaffirmed by what has been said and what hasn't been said by the panel. I wonder, how many R&D proposals am I permitted to submit? Is there a limitation?

MR. PACK: There isn't a limitation, but I think it would be stronger if you kept it to a reasonable number.

Q: A reasonable two. I can do that.

MR. PACK: Two, three.

Q: Two, three is good. Is biography an acceptable format?

MR. PACK: Yes. There is no genre limitation. Even drama is acceptable, except for its cost. So we have no genre restrictions.

Q: It says here, all R&D grant recipients will be required to execute the Crossroads R&D agreement by March 15<sup>th</sup>, 2004. Is that an error?

MR. PACK: I'd have to check. But the point is that it will have to be executed before a grant is given.

Q: I'm sorry. I read this wrong, so I apologize for that question. My last one, how much do you have available for production funding? You mentioned how much for dissemination and for R&D.

MR. PACK: We have up to \$20 million for the total project, all three phases together.

Q: I have a question for the panel and for you at the same time. I'm kind of troubled, being a federal officer for homeland security. For almost three years I've been watching our money dwindle, and I decided to start to watch the money trail. I wonder whether or not you find it troubling that the money for foreign policy seems to be going specifically to corporations such as Halliburton and Conoco, which are controlled by the Carlyle Group, which is directly connected to Bush senior. And a \$6 billion contract with the bin Laden brothers, which was signed on 9/11, at the Ritz Carlton, has not been cancelled, and we're still doing business in Korea, yet the organizations that I'm working with on the front line is losing funding. So we're basically standing on the front line with nice uniforms and no teeth, while the money is actually going to big business.

MR. PACK: The subject of funding and where the money goes is, of course, a good subject for a documentary. It's tricky to turn it into good television, but it's a fine subject. You have to have something new to say and some angle. I think that clearly is in the scope of the initiative.

MR. BOOT: I'll just briefly reply because I think your characterization of the facts is false. In fact, we've seen a tremendous increase in funding for homeland security since 9/11, including the creation of the Department of Homeland Security. We have also seen an increase in funding for the Department of Defense in general, not just the homeland security side but for the military in general, for our public diplomacy, for all sorts of things.

I think the key to winning the war on terrorism is that you have to play both offense and defense. You can't limit yourself to one. Of course you need to play defense, you need to check people at the airport, you need to have a strong domestic security component, but we're always going to be a wide open society. There are limits to what we can do, and the fiendish ingenuity of our enemies is practically endless. They will always come up with some way to attack us that we haven't thought of. And therefore we can't just afford to play defense.

We have to play offense and go and stop them before they wind up on our shores. That's partly a military mission, having to do with going into places like Afghanistan. It's also partly a public diplomacy mission. It's partly spreading our message around the world. And so it's proper that we ought to be spending money on things other than simply homeland defense, although that's important.

And I don't think there's much credence to your charge that somehow the administration is profiteering by handing these sweetheart deals to Halliburton or

whatever. In fact, Halliburton is a company that has been in the business of supporting U.S. troops in the field for many decades. They got major contracts under the Clinton administration as well as under the Bush administration. There are a limited number of companies that do this kind of work. It's a highly specialized area. They had the contract before 9/11. I don't see any evidence that there's anything shady about it.

MR. MEAD: That said, I think procurement contracts in all our wars, going back to the Revolution, have been ghastly sources of scandal, inefficiency, and fraud. During the Second World War the Truman Commission investigated wrongdoing in things connected with that war. Obviously the people involved may be criminals. I don't know that you have to say that there's some kind of grand, vast government conspiracy to somehow pervert everything. It's just that suddenly there's a lot of money being spent and some people are ever attuned to being profiteers in a war.

But the taxpayers are putting a lot of money into homeland security. I understand even domestically there's a lot of inefficiency and chaos in the department, plus the stuff overseas. This is what journalists and film makers can contribute--make sure this process stays as honest as possible.

Q: I suspect you might want to resist specifics on this because you'll want to keep your options open, and I do understand that it depends on what proposals are submitted. But I would like to hear some numbers--how many different producers or production entities do you envision funding, and what the split might be between series and one-offs, as CPB often likes to call them? If you do want to resist numbers, I'd like to ask a follow-up question.

MR. PACK: It's hard to say what the split between single documentaries or series will be. I feel that this initiative probably will lean toward more one-offs. I think that it will be upwards of 20 shows in the end, 20 different productions. How many of them are series does depend on the budgets. It just can't be predicted. What's your follow-up question?

Q: No, it was more specific than I envisioned.

Q: Are you going to create a broadcast strand to show where producers go to have a show picked?

MR. PACK: We alluded to this a little in the RFP. We are still discussing with PBS exactly how they might broadcast them, whether they'll be simply be folded into the schedule, or whether they'll be branded, or how they'll be packaged. We're forming a Station Advisory Group that will let us know what the system wants and how to use them most effectively. So that's an area where we are keeping our options open until we have a better sense of what the funded programs will be.

Q: I know questions were raised a couple of times about domestic issues, but I still feel I need clarification on what you're looking for. It sounds like you're really

entertaining all sorts of themes, but relating back to 9/11 does not seem synonymous with foreign policy. I'm just wanting to hear clarification about whether that's what you're looking for.

MR. PACK: We are absolutely not limited to foreign policy. The Crossroads Initiative has as a premise that we entered a new era on 9/11. This new era raised new questions, or as Adrian might say, heightened existing questions. As long as the proposal's themes relate to the larger post 9/11 themes, it can be domestic or foreign policy or some combination of the two.

Q: This is for you, Michael. It says in the RFP that you're going to demand perspectives from across the political and philosophic spectrum, and that the funding decisions will seek balance across the initiative as a whole. I wonder if you could tell us a little bit about what processes and standards you're going to put in place to ensure balance and diversity. I think this is particularly relevant given the reaction that you had today to, let's say, the less than stellar diversity of the panel. Thank you.

MR. BOOT: Can I just say something before you answer? I've noticed from the questions a less than stellar diversity in the audience. It seems to me that the audience is all pretty much all leaning one way, and I think a lot of people here could benefit from hearing another point of view.

Q: Even yours?

MR. BOOT: Even mine, believe it or not.

Q: I'd like to take just a moment to respond, and then I'd like to get an answer to my question from Mr. Pack. Speaking as a white Anglo-American, I personally find it extremely tone deaf as well as offensive and insulting to the audience to come here with five white men, when you're saying that you're seeking balance and diversity. I understand that you probably didn't get it. I hope that you get it now, and I'm asking a question to ascertain what are the standards that you're going to use to ensure that there is diversity in the funding.

MR. BOOT: I notice you're only looking at – I'll let you answer, Michael, but I just note that –

Q: What I'm looking at is five white men in suits.

MR. BOOT: What you're looking at is a narrow, one-definitional, one-dimensional definition of diversity. You're only focused on ethnic and skin color. You're not looking at diversity –

MR. MEAD: My HMO wouldn't approve my operation, okay?

MR. BOOT: You're not looking at –

Q: You're a same-sex panel.

MR. BOOT: The one thing that you're missing is ideological diversity, which I would suggest the people in this room need to think about a little harder.

MR. PACK: Let me answer the question in relationship to funding. We will use the traditional CPB review process with some added processes. Before being awarded a grant, competitive proposals will be vetted by outside reviewers. Projects to be funded will also be reviewed by an advisory board that is yet to be identified. But when the board is developed, we will publish those names. CPB will review and select and announce R&D grants on a rolling basis. And you can judge for yourselves if we meet our standards, and you can object if it does not. I think you should judge by the final product and let us know if you think we're not meeting our standards.

Q: Listening to the questions from the audience it seems that some of us here have judged and discriminated against the panelists because of their gender, the color of their skin, and their clothes. I think we can fall into that very easily and that would be unfortunate. I for one feel that the opportunity for topics and themes that filmmakers could try to delve into and expose are pretty broad-ranging on the whole. My question is, Max, you said that our ideals were not being positively or effectively transmitted through our policies. My concern is – and it was reinforced by the fact that you said it doesn't matter who's in the White House. It doesn't matter what the administration is. It's going to be pretty much the same, was your thought. Who is really, then, in control of these policies that are failing to put our ideals out?

I'm reminded of the movie *Network*, where they talk about the real power being the petro-dollars. Is there like an emperor's new clothes thing, where we think of the government and the people controlling what's going on, but they're not really – is it really the multinationals? As we see five companies doing the job of what hundreds of companies used to do. We're talking about foreign policy. Whose foreign policy is it that's really making the policy, and does the government really have an effect on what goes on?

My question for CPB is, what is their sensitivity? At what level will that kind of thing be allowed to be discussed and exposed without them saying, well, wait a minute, we can't deal with this. We need to stick to who's in the White House and what the Congress is doing, when perhaps the real power is a few levels removed from that. Thank you.

MR. BOOT: I have never found this hidden power that's secretly controlling American foreign policy. I should know, because I work at the Council on Foreign Relations--if you Google it, you'll find we're at the center of about half the conspiracy theories out there. Despite that, I've never seen a black helicopter landing at the Council on Foreign Relations, and I've never been in any of these backroom meetings where U.S. policy is really decided.

MR. MEAD: Let me say Max hasn't been at the Council for a very long time.  
(Laughter)

MR. BOOT: That might be the problem.

MR. MEAD: You've got to prove yourself a little bit before we tell you everything. (Laughter)

MR. BOOT: Well, I hope that my performance as a lackey for the Pentagon here will win me the trust of the Council. (Laughter)

MR. MEAD: You're doing better, Max. You're moving up. Moving up.

MR. BOOT: But I think what you're seeing, in all seriousness, is that serious people in the Republican and Democratic parties confront the same problems, whoever is in office. And their solutions often wind up being fairly similar. I don't think it's because they're paid agents of some unseen conspiracy, but simply because in fact this is what happens when serious people deal with serious issues. And there does tend to be a centralizing effect on American government. The extremes of both the left and the right do tend to be locked out of the policy process, which I think is generally a good thing. What you see is basically the center left and center right. I think that makes for stable politics and, overall, effective politics and governance.

It does, however, lead to some problems and you touched on one of them, which I referred to before: I think we've made a lot of mistakes in our policy in the Middle East. But the reason we did so was because many administrations over many years and many people at the State Department thought this was the best policy to promote American interests.

There are others who argue that it wasn't. Now I think that those people arguing that it wasn't have had their case greatly strengthened by the events of 9/11 and after, and we're trying to change our policy. You're saying it often takes a shock on the level of 9/11 in order to make a major reorientation of U.S. policy, and that reorientation is still not complete. It's an interesting story about how we've decided that we shouldn't just willy-nilly go around propping up dictatorial regimes like the one in Saudi Arabia, the one in Pakistan, in return for the short-term benefits. We realize that we do have to be more active in promoting our interests and values, and the question is how to do it without leading to the toppling of these regimes in a way that creates more dangers than the regimes themselves.

These are the kinds of tough issues that administrations grapple with. The range of difference between the serious thinkers on the left and right is not as vast as all the hype and hysteria that you see reflected in books, whether by Ann Coulter or Noam Chomsky. I think that's actually a sign of the seriousness and the fact that our policy process does generally work, even though sometimes we get things wrong.

MR. KARATNYCKY: Can I just say, Max talked about asymmetrical power, but the United States is an asymmetrical power and Western Europe is an asymmetrical power in terms of control of technology, control of wealth, and so forth. This naturally breeds resentment. I think the United States can do a better or worse job, but short of a massive redistribution project, I think there will always be groups, countries, people who will be resentful of that power, and some of them will respond violently.

I don't think the American people are ready to sacrifice their well-being. The American middle class or the wealthy in this country are going to resist this. Our political system responds to their will. When we have debates about foreign aid, we have debates about increasing it from a couple of billion to \$10 billion. These are very small proportions of our wealth, and I don't think that that nexus will change.

So how to project our image is only one part of the story. Perhaps we can do a better job in not hectoring people and speaking more openly. But in the end it's going to be about power, it's going to be about wealth, it's going to be about redistribution. Those asymmetries are not going to go away, and realistically, in democracies, people are very reluctant to make them go away. That's one of the great paradoxes. We have it and we're not going to give it up. That's what most Americans would say, if you asked them whether they'd be willing to be taxed 10 percent to give money to the United Nations in a redistribution effort. I think they would overwhelmingly say no. Whether that is a good thing or a bad thing depends on how you think change occurs in the world. It might be a bad thing, but it is a reality. I think that's the reason why no matter how we speak, our policies and our leaders will be forced into a particular direction, and no matter what nice PR efforts we have through the State Department or U.S. information efforts, the end result will be that these gaps will continue to breed conflict and discontent.

MR. MEAD: I just want to jump in here and say that also underlying a lot of this continuity are some realities. The Kyoto Protocol in the Clinton administration was defeated 95 to 0 in the Senate, and you need two-thirds of the Senate to ratify a treaty. The reality is, no matter who gets elected president of the United States, the United States Senate is not going to ratify the International Criminal Court treaty in its current form. It's not going to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in its current form, and it's not going to ratify the Kyoto Protocol in its current form.

To some degree the Clinton administration made a big production about how supportive it was of these things, even though people in the White House with pocket calculators knew how dead all these proposals were. And the Bush administration, also pandering to its own base, has exaggerated the importance of its gleeful repudiation of these things. But the reality is that because of the United States Constitution that, for example, gives the half million people in Wyoming an equal number of senators with the 40 million or whatever in California, we're just not going to do certain things as our political system is currently constituted.

Now, I strongly believe the limits of action on American politicians, both by the

objective political constraints and the structural nature of our institutions, is fascinating stuff, and I would think you could come up with terrific TV shows on it. You might do four different things and be encouraged by different ones. I don't know. But these things are real and people do not make foreign policy in an institutional vacuum.

MR. PACK: Let me answer the Crossroads-specific part of that question. To reiterate, we are committed to reflecting a diversity of points of view in this initiative. I think that the panel is right, that things narrow when it comes time to govern. But in terms of the initiative itself, we would want to broaden the points of view. We want a wide range of serious and thoughtful views. I encourage all of you to strongly present in your proposals whatever point of view you may have, whether or not you think the panel agrees with it or I agree with it.

I believe public television needs to be more controversial. I would like to see more provocative shows from across the political spectrum. So I encourage you to provide that. That's part of the purpose of this initiative, to expand the debate in that sense, as well as deeper understanding. So if you feel strongly about something, submit a proposal that reflects your view. That said, proposals will have to meet basic standards of journalism. They have to be fair and objective, they have to be well researched, but they can have an underlying point of view.

Q: I just wanted to ask, since we do have foreign policy expertise here and Mr. Mead suggested one interesting area would be what is American foreign policy, I wondered if you might give us a brief sort of history or characterization of the discipline of foreign policy, how it relates to history, is it a social science, did it start in 1941 also?

MR. MEAD: I'll be very brief and say there is no officially constituted discipline of foreign policy, which is a good thing because I never even went to graduate school, never graduated from graduate school, so I couldn't be in it if there were any standards. What you find in the field is that people come in with different types of expertise. A lot of people will come from a political science background, international relations and so on, although, as is the case with a lot of social science disciplines, as I'm sure many people here know, there's a tendency for an academic discipline to become more hermetic and inner-focused as time goes on, and less and less concerned with questions in the external world. It's more discourse-oriented and theoretically driven. But you get people coming in from history. Actually journalism, you may be interested to know, is a significant feeder stream. I think both Max and I basically come out of journalism as much as anything.

But one interesting thing is that it's one of the few areas where almost everybody is unquestionably Euro-centric in the sense that the Westphalian state system or European power politics of the 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> centuries is sort of generalized over everything as the norm, and even if people have to radically distort what they're looking at, they try to jam it into that framework.

One of the interesting things about foreign policy today, I think, is that that

intellectual framework certainly doesn't describe where the United States is as a power. I think it less and less describes more and more significant actors in the world and needs to be changed.

Q: Maybe you already addressed this, but once the funding is given, how much creative control will all the producers have? Can you speak to that?

MR. PACK: The creative control will rest with the producers, as has always been the practice at CPB. There is no difference from our standard funding patterns in this case.

Let me conclude by saying I thank you all for coming. I'm happy to have strong views expressed, as long as it's polite. Feel free to contact me. We're going to have a reception. Those who didn't have a chance to ask a question and are burning to ask one, please ask me or the panel. I very sincerely want the shows funded to be powerful statements of a diversity of points of view and come from a diverse group of producers. I will rely on the people in the room to hold me to it. Thank you.